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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays on markets with indivisibilities where each buyer
wants at most one indivisible good and each seller provides more than one unit. Unlike the
standard literature of markets with indivisibilities, quasi-linearity is not assumed for utility
functions of buyers.
The rst essay (Chapter 2) studies the structure of competitive equilibria. The main
result shows that for each type (say t) of indivisible goods, if there are multiple competitive
equilibrium prices for type t, then the competitive equilibrium quantity for type t is unique;
in the same manner, if there are multiple competitive equilibrium quantities for type t, then
the competitive equilibrium price for type t is unique. As a corollary of the main result, the
set of competitive price vectors shrinks to a unique point when a market has a large number
of sellers. It is also argued that the main result cannot be extended to a market model where
each buyer may demand more than one unit of indivisible goods.
The second essay (Chapter 3) evaluates the di¤erence between the upper and lower bounds
of the set of competitive price vectors. The upper and lower bounds are calculated by
certain systems of equations, respectively. The main result shows that the di¤erence between
the upper and lower bounds of competitive price vectors is bounded by the di¤erence of
incomes of two specic households. The main result implies that the di¤erence tends to zero
when the number of households is large and their incomes are distributed in a relatively
continuous manner. and thus, the calculated upper (lower) bound is a good approximation
for a competitive price vector.
The third essay (Chapter 4) studies the relation between income distribution and housing
rents based on the market model with indivisibilities (housing is classied into nite cate-
gories by quality). In particular, it is examined that how rising income inequality a¤ects
a competitive rent vector. The main result shows that there are three cases when income
inequality increased: (1) competitive rents rise in every housing category, (2) rents rise in
upper-categories but fall in lower-categories, or (3) rents fall in every category. The second
result shows that case (1) is a special case. It is also argued with numerical examples that
it tends to show case (3) as the diminishing rate of marginal utility for housing quality gets
larger; equivalently, the diminishing rate of marginal utility for composite goods gets smaller.
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Mathematical Notations
Throughout the dissertation, vectors are written by small letters a; b; x; y; etc., while sets
are written by capital letters A;B;X; Y; etc. The t-th component of vector x is written by
xt. Other symbols and notations are listed below (In the list, vectors are T -dimension).
Symbol Meaning
x  y xt  yt for all t = 1; :::; T:
jxtj The absolute value of xt.
ax The inner product of a and x (
PT
t=1 atxt).
X  Y The set Y weakly includes X (x 2 X implies x 2 Y ).
XnY The set fx : x 2 X and x =2 Y g:
jXj The cardinality of the set X.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Markets with indivisibilities
In the traditional ArrowDebreus general equilibrium model, commodities are assumed to
be perfectly divisible. The perfect divisibility enables us to apply calculus depending on
continuity of utility functions to the model. The assumption of perfect divisibility is suitable
for economies where the amount of consumption/production is large for every economic agent
and also the amount can be freely chosen. On the other hand, markets with indivisibilities
are common in the real world (e.g., housing, labor or license markets). These markets are
not suitable for general equilibrium model, because in such markets, small (discrete) number
of units are demanded/supplied by consumers and/or producers. Unlike general equilibrium
model, in markets with indivisibilities for which the di¤erential method is not applicable, it
can not be said that an analytical method is well established. In this dissertation, we aim
to develop methods for studying markets with indivisibilities. In particular, we focus on the
market model where each consumer wants at most one indivisible commodity.
The seminal study of markets with indivisibilities is found in Böhm-Bawerk (1891). The
author considered the horse market where the economic agents are divided into sellers and
buyers, each seller owns one horse for sale under his reservation price, and a buyer wants to
buy exactly one horse under his valuation price. The horses to be traded are assumed to be
homogeneous, i.e., all the horses are non-di¤erentiated and exchanged in the same market
price. In such a model, the author studied how one (or both) side competition a¤ects the
market price formation.
Shapley and Shubik (1972) also studied two-sided market where each buyer (seller) de-
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mands (supplies) at most one unit (their model is called the assignment game). The authors
apply the framework of cooperative game theory. Unlike Böhm-Bawerk, the authors allow
commodity di¤erentiation for indivisible goods. In this sense, Böhm-Bawerks market game
is a special case of the assignment game. This generalization allows us to study such sit-
uations that each buyer wants (chooses) exactly one unit from several types but the same
kind of indivisible units.1 The authors proved the non-emptiness of the core by using linear
programming problem. The assumption of quasi-linearity (QL) for playersutility function is
then crucial for the application of linear programming (nevertheless, QL is not necessary for
the existence of the core).2 The authors also proved that the core always coincides with the
set of competitive allocations. This equivalence theorem shows a di¤erence between the mar-
ket with and without indivisibilities, because in general equilibrium model the equivalence
between the core and competitive allocation is obtained only under a large replica economy.
Another result by the authors is that the core contains two specic imputations: buyer-
optimal imputation and seller-optimal imputation. Buyer-optimal imputation corresponds
to the minimum competitive price vector, and seller-optimal corresponds to the maximum
competitive price vector.
As with the assignment game by Shapley and Shubik, most literature of market with
indivisibilities assumed QL on a utility function. QL requires linearity for utility of money,
which ignores income e¤ects on buyers demand on indivisible commodities. Therefore, QL
is inappropriate to markets where objects of trade are large relative to the expenditure such
as housings. Kaneko (1982) generalized the assignment game to the model where QL is not
required for buyersutility functions and each seller may provides more than one indivisible
good of the same type. This market model is called a generalized assignment market (GAM).
While Shapley and Shubik applied linear programming for the proof of the existence of the
core, Kaneko used the main theorem of Scarf (1967) for the existence of that.3 The author
also proved the equivalence between the core and competitive equilibria under some condition.
1For instance, a typical household wants one dwelling in a lifetime, but his preference for housing types may
di¤erent from each other (e.g., sizes, locations, etc.). The assignment game can describes such a situation.
2Formally, the assignment game is dened as follows. Let M = f1; :::;mg be the set of buyers and N =
f1; :::; ng is the set of sellers. Let vij  0 be the buyer i 2 Ms valuation price for indivisible object of seller
j 2 N , and rj  0 be the reservation price of seller j. By the assumption of quasi-linear utility function, the
assignment game can be simply described by matrix form A = (aij)(i;j)2MN where aij = maxfvij   rj ; 0g
and its characteristic function is dened by v(S) = max[ai1j1 + ai2j2 +    + aikjk ] where i1; :::; ik 2 S \M
and j1; :::; jk 2 S \N .
3The main theorem (Theorem 1) of Scarf (1967) states that the core of a balanced game is non-empty.
Kaneko (1982) proved a generalized assignment game is balanced game [the proof relies on the main theorem
of Shapley and Scarf (1974)].
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This dissertation follows the GAM model by Kaneko. As stated earlier, the existence of
competitive equilibrium is guaranteed by the study of Kaneko. On the other hand, there may
exist multiple equilibria, and the structure of equilibria is not clear. This makes applications
of GAM in comparative statics di¢ cult. Therefore, the main purpose of our study is to
clarify the structure of competitive equilibria in the GAM model. To be precise, we study
characteristics of the set of competitive equilibria. Furthermore, as an application for the
GAM model and our obtained results, we study comparative statics analyses in housing
markets.
1.2 Brief review of other related literature
Here, we briey summarize other researches related to our study.
In this dissertation, we also investigate the existency of competitive equilibrium in markets
without QL where each buyer may demand more than one unitof an indivisible good. Un-
der the assumption QL, some researchers study an existence condition of the core/competitive
equilibria in such markets. Kelso and Crawford (1982) showed that the gross substitute (GS)
condition is su¢ cient for the existence of the core/competitive equilibria.4 Gul and Stacchetti
(1999) also showed GS is a necessary condition for the existence of equilibria. However, it
is an open question whether their results can be extended to market models withoutQL.
For an answer, we give an example where GS holds but no competitive equilibria without QL
(Section 2.4 of Chapter 2).
We also state Pareto e¢ ciency and incentive compatibility of the GAM model (Section
2.2 and Appendix A of Chapter 2). These properties are studied in a eld of auction theory.5
We show that every competitive equilibrium in GAM satises Pareto e¢ ciency (Appendix
A of Chapter 2). Furthermore, we discuss incentive compatibility in GAM (Section 2.2 of
Chapter 2). Incentive compatibility is considered as an important property to design the
trading mechanism, since in such a one-shot trade, agents have incentives to disguise with
their own preferences to inuence the nal outcome. The most related study is Demange and
Gale (1985). The authors proved that in Shapley and Shubiks assignment game without QL,
4GS is a condition about a buyers individual demand correspondence. In words, a demand satises GS i¤
rise in price for some goods causes the demands for the other goods remain the same or increase.
5 In auction theory, trades are considered to be held one-shot. On the other hand, the GAM model supposes
an application for housing markets, and a competitive equilibrium is considered as market equilibrium after
long time trading rather than one-shot trading.
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an allocation rule to select a minimum competitive equilibrium satises strategy-proofness
for buyers.6 Recent research by Serizawa and Morimoto (2015) proved that in Demange and
Gales model without sellers, an allocation rule to select a minimum competitive equilibrium
is the only rule to satisfy strategy-proofness. Since the assumption for buyers in GAM is
same as Demange and Gales model, we can directly extend their results, i.e., in the GAM
model, an allocation rule to select a minimum competitive equilibrium is the only rule to
satisfy strategy-proofness for buyers.
We also investigate fairness of competitive equilibrium allocation in GAM (Appendix C
of Chapter 4). Svensson (1983), Alkan, Demange and Gale (1991) and Sakai (2007) studied
the theory of fairness to markets with indivisibilities.7 ;8 The main problem is how to fairly
allocate indivisibles by monetary translation: the indivisibles represents not only private
goods but also bads with public nature (e.g., a society tries to determine the place of garbage-
disposal facilities). It is shown by Svensson (and also Alkan et al.) that there exists a equitable
allocation; every equitable allocation is Pareto e¢ cient (thus every equitable allocation is fair)
and; the set of equitable allocation coincides with the set of competitive allocation with equal
income. In Appendix C of Chapter 4, we briey mention fairness of competitive equilibrium
in our market model. It is a result that a competitive allocation is fair if and only if every
household has the same income.
1.3 Chapter overviews
The dissertation consists of three essays (Chapter 2, 3 and 4). Chapter 2 investigates math-
ematical structures of the set of competitive equilibria under basic assumptions. Chapter
3 investigates the di¤erence between the upper and lower bounds of the set of competitive
price vectors under some additional assumptions. The market model of Chapter 3 aims an
application for housing markets. Chapter 4 gives comparative statics analyses in the market
model of Chapter 3. Details are described below.
Chapter 2 examines characteristics of the set of competitive equilibria in GAM. As men-
6We give denitions. An allocation (or auction) rule is a function from the set of agentspreference proles
to the allocation. An allocation rule is strategy-proof i¤ it is a dominant strategy for each agent to announce
his true preferences.
7Their model also assumed that each buyer demands at most one unit of an indivisible good.
8The original denition of fairness is rst given by Foley (1967). According to him, an allocation is called
fair i¤ (1) an allocation is Pareto e¢ cient and (2) every agent is utility maximized with his consumption
compared to any other agents consumption.
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tioned earlier, there exists a competitive equilibrium in GAM (Kaneko, 1982). On the as-
sumption of the existence of a competitive equilibrium, we show the structure of the set of
competitive equilibria. Let T ( 1) be the number of types for indivisible goods and x ar-
bitrarily a type t (1  t  T ). The main result shows that the set of competitive equilibria
has the non-simultaneous multiplicity structure for each type of indivisible goods: if there
are multiple competitive equilibrium prices for type t, then competitive equilibrium quantity
of type t is unique; equivalently, if there are multiple competitive quantities for type t, com-
petitive price of type t is unique. This structure is well-known in the case of no commodity
di¤erentiation (Böhm-Bawerks market game). The main result implies that even if we allow
commodity di¤erentiation, this non-simultaneous multiplicity holds separately for each type
of goods. Based on the main result, we give the second result on the evaluation of the sizes
of the sets of competitive prices and quantities. As an application of these two results, we
give a shrinkage theorem on the set of competitive price vectors. We also study whether our
results can be extended to a market model where each buyer may demand more than one
unit of an indivisible good: we argue that our results can not be extended even if demand
corresponding of each buyer satises GS condition.
Chapter 3 evaluates the di¤erence between the upper and lower bounds of the set of
competitive price vectors in the application model of GAM. In the analysis, the following
assumptions are added: identical utility function and normality of indivisible goods. This
market model assumes the rental housing market and is introduced by Kaneko (1983) and
Kaneko, Ito and Osawa (2006). Under additional assumptions, the upper and lower bounds
of the competitive price set are calculated by certain systems of equations, respectively. The
upper (lower) bound coincides with the maximum (minimum) competitive price vector under
some condition. The main result shows that the di¤erence between the upper and lower
bounds of competitive price vectors is bounded by the di¤erence of incomes of specic two
households. Since this two households are adjacent to each other with respect to income, the
main result implies that the di¤erence tends to zero when the number of households is large
and their incomes are thickly distributed. Therefore, the calculated upper (lower) bound is a
good approximation for a competitive price vector. Throughout Chapter 3, the main result
of Chapter 2 is applied and used for the analysis.
Chapter 4 studies the relation between income distribution and housing rents based on the
rental housing market model by Kaneko, Ito and Osawa (2006), where housing is classied into
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nite categories by quality. In particular, we investigate how rising income inequality a¤ects
a competitive rent vector. The main comparative statics result shows that when household
income inequality increases, either (1) increased rent for every housing category; (2) increased
rent for housing of upper-quality category but decreased rent for that of lower-quality cat-
egory; (3) decreased rent for every housing category. (1) and (3) seem as counterintuitive
because it is natural that rising income inequality causes a decline in rent for lower categories
and a rise in rent for upper categories. Indeed, the second result shows that case (1) is a
special case, while (3) may not be a special. We also argue with numerical examples that
it tends to show case (3) as the diminishing rate of marginal utility for housing quality gets
larger or the diminishing rate of marginal utility for composite goods gets smaller. Since the
diminishing rate of marginal utility is related to the marginal rate of substitution, this obser-
vation implies that there is a certain tendency between the marginal rate of substitution and
rent changes. Note that analyses of Chapter 4 rely on evaluation result on the competitive
rent vector, which is shown in Chapter 3.
13
Chapter 2
Characteristics of Competitive
Equilibria in Assignment Markets
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study the structure of the set of competitive equilibria in an assignment
market. This market consists of two types of economic agents; sellers and buyers. The objects
of trade are several types of indivisible goods and a perfectly divisible good (money). Each
seller may provide multiple units of an indivisible good, but each buyer demands at most
one unit of an indivisible good. We adopt the model of the generalized assignment market
(abbreviate it as GAM) from Kaneko (1982).
The GAM model is a generalization of Shapley and Shubiks (1972) assignment market
model in that each seller may provide multiple units of an indivisible good and the quasi-
linearity (QL) assumption on utility functions of buyers is removed. Kaneko (1982) proved
the existence of a competitive equilibrium in the GAM model, while Kaneko (1983) applied
the GAM model to housing markets.
The GAM/assignment model targets economic problems of indivisible objects such as
houses, cars, and labor. There is a salient di¤erence from the standard general equilibrium
model with perfectly divisible goods (cf., Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995). One exam-
ple is that the core of the assignment model coincides with the set of competitive allocations
(Kaneko, 1982; Quinzii, 1984), while in the general equilibrium model, this coincidence can be
obtained in a large replica economy (Debreu and Scarf, 1963). The structure of competitive
equilibria in the GAM model also di¤ers considerably from those in the general equilibrium
14
Figure 2.1: The possibilities for the structure of c.e. without commodity di¤erentiation.
model. In this paper, we give three theorems for the structure of competitive equilibria, from
which we can observe clear di¤erences between the structures of competitive equilibria for
the general equilibrium and GAM models.
The main theorem of this paper is Theorem 2.3.1 in Section 2.3. We provide another
theorem, Theorem 2.3.2, on the evaluation of competitive prices/quantities. From those
theorems, we obtain the shrinkage result, Theorem 2.5.2, which states that as the market
size increases, the set of competitive prices shrinks to a unique price. In this introduction,
we describe Theorem 2.3.1, and briey mention the other theorems.
Let T ( 1) be the number of types of indivisible goods, and let t be an integer with
1  t  T .
Theorem 2.3.1. If there are multiple competitive prices for good t, then the equilibrium
quantity of t is unique; if there are multiple equilibrium quantity for good t, then the com-
petitive price of t is unique.
Thus, Theorem 2.3.1 shows that it is not possible that the market has multiple competitive
prices and equilibrium quantities for some indivisible good t.
Theorem 2.3.1 is better understood in the case where all indivisible goods are homoge-
neous, i.e., T = 1. This special case is known as the Böhm-Bawerk horse market (Böhm-
Bawerk, 1891). When T = 1, the demand and supply schedules are expressed on two-
dimensional surface, as illustrated in Fig. 2.1. Their intersection constitutes the set of
competitive equilibria. As in Fig. 2.1, there are three possibilities for the structure of com-
petitive equilibria. In Case 1, there are multiple equilibrium prices and a unique equilibrium
quantity, in Case 2, there are multiple quantities and a unique price, and in Case 3, both are
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uniquely determined.1 Theorem 2.3.1 shows that even if we allow commodity di¤erentiation
(T > 1), this structure holds separately for each type of an indivisible good.
In the literature, some extended model is also considered where each buyer may demand
more than one unit of an indivisible good. It is known that the extended model has a com-
petitive equilibrium under the gross substitutes (GS) assumption on the individual demand
correspondence and under the QL assumption for the buyers (see Kelso and Crawford, 1982,
Gul and Stacchetti, 1999). It may be wondered if Theorem 2.3.1 can be extended to such a
model. We show that under the GS and QL assumptions, Theorem 2.3.1 can be extended to
such an extended model.
However, since our model targets an economic situation where each unit of an indivisible
good is non-negligible relative to a buyers income, we would like to remove the QL assumption
from our study. We provide an example, with the GS but without the QL assumption, where
Theorem 2.3.1 fails. Thus, the theorem cannot be extended only under the GS assumption.
In fact, we give another example satisfying GS but having no competitive equilibria.
Theorem 2.3.2 characterizes the size of the set of competitive prices for good t (equilibrium
quantities, respectively) in terms of marginal costs for sellers.
Based on Theorems 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, we obtain a shrinkage result, Theorem 2.5.2 on the
set of competitive prices for a large GAM. Shapley and Shubik (1972) observed, for the
homogeneous case (T = 1), that the set of competitive prices shrinks to a unique price when
a market becomes large and dense. They expected that this would also hold in the general
case (T > 1), but also stated a di¢ culty caused by the increase of the dimensionality of the
set of equilibria. In fact, we directly obtain their expected result from Theorems 2.3.1 and
2.3.2, while avoiding the di¢ culty indicated by them. Since Theorems 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 hold
for each type t, we meet no di¢ culty in the dimensionality of the set of equilibria; a shrinkage
result can be obtained separately for each type of an indivisible good.
For notational simplicity, except for Section 2.5, we assume that for each t = 1; :::; T , all
the indivisible goods of type t are provided by only one seller. However, this assumption
can be made without loss of generality when considering a competitive equilibrium. This
aggregation result will be discussed in Section 2.5.1.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the GAM model. Section 2.3
1Let mc(y) (y 2 Z+) be the sellers marginal cost of additional one unit at supply y. In Case 3, it holds
that mc(y) = mc(y + 1) for supply y, and the competitive equilibrium is uniquely determined with the
price mc(y) and supply y + 1.
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presents two theorems about the structure of competitive equilibria. Section 2.4 is concerned
with the extendibility of our main theorem to an extended market model. Section 2.5 shows
the aggregation result of the sellers, and shows the shrinkage theorem on the competitive
prices in a large GAM. Conclusions and closing remarks are presented in Section 2.6.
2.2 Generalized assignment markets
We denote the generalized assignment market model by (M;N), where M = f10; : : : ;m0g
denotes the set of buyers and N = f1; : : : ; ng denotes the set of sellers. There are T -types
of indivisible goods to be traded for a perfectly divisible good, called money.
The consumption set for a buyer is given as X := fe0; e1; : : :; eT g  R+; where for t 6= 0;
et is the T -dimensional unit vector with t-th component 1 and e0 = 0, and R+ is the set of
non-negative real numbers. A consumption vector (et; d) 2 X with t > 0 means that a buyer
consumes one unit of indivisible good of type-t and d amount of (perfectly divisible) money.
For t = 0; no indivisible goods are consumed. The initial endowment of each buyer i 2M is
given as (e0; Ii) with Ii > 0, that is, buyer i 2M initially has an income Ii and no indivisible
goods. Each buyer wants to buy at most one unit of an indivisible good by paying part of Ii.
We dene buyer is utility function as ui : X ! R: We assume the following for ui:
Assumption A1 (Continuity and Monotonicity). For each xi 2 fe0; e1; : : :; eT g; ui(xi; d)
is a continuous and strictly monotone increasing function with respect to d.
Assumption A2 (Boundary condition). ui(e0; Ii) > ui(et; 0) for all t = 1; :::; T:
A1 needs no explanation. A2 means that a buyer prefers to keep his initial endowment
to consuming any indivisible good by paying all his income Ii.
Each seller j 2 N provides indivisible goods of exactly one type, but each may provide
more than one unit. We divide the set N into N1; : : : ; NT ; where Nt is the set of all sellers
who provide indivisible good t. Let t = 1; :::; T . We dene the cost function of seller j 2 Nt
as cj : Z+ ! R+; where Z+ is the set of non-negative integers, and cj(yj) represents the cost
(in terms of money) of producing yj units of indivisible goods t. For each j 2 Nt; we dene
the marginal cost mcj(yj) := cj(yj +1)  cj(yj) for yj 2 Z+:We assume the following for cj :
Assumption B1 (No xed cost). cj(0) = 0 and cj(0) < cj(1):
Assumption B2 (Convexity). mcj(yj)  mcj(yj + 1) for all yj 2 Z+:
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The rst assumption means that no xed costs are required, but that a positive cost is
required for production. Assumption B2 is a discrete version of convexity, meaning that a
marginal cost increases by one additional unit. Note that this cost function is one-dimensional
case of M\-convex function (Murota, 2003).
The model given in Shapley and Shubik (1972) can be regarded as a special case of the
above GAM model. They assumed that each buyer i 2M wants to buy at most one unit of
indivisible good with a quasi-linear (QL) utility function, i.e., ui(et; d) = ui(et; 0) + d for all
(et; d) 2 X; and each seller j 2 N has one unit of an indivisible good for sale with reservation
price rj > 0: In A1 and A2, we do not assume quasi-linearity and allow income e¤ects in
buyersbehavior. A seller in Shapley and Shubiks model is expressed in our model as a seller
having the cost function cj(yj) with cj(1) = rj and cj(yj) =largefor yj  2.
For notational simplicity, we assume that the set Nt of sellers of type t consists of one
seller, i.e.,
Nt = ftg for all t = 1; :::; T: (1.1)
This means that the sellers of type t can be represented by one aggregated seller. This
assumption can be made without loss of generality, as far as the competitive equilibrium is
concerned. This will be shown in Section 2.5.1.
In the GAM model, we consider the concept of a competitive equilibrium. Let (p; x; y) =
((p1; : : : ; pT ); (x10 ; : : : ; xm0); (y1; : : : ; yT )) be a triple of p 2 RT+; x 2 fe0; e1; : : : ; eT gm
0
and
y 2 ZT+:
Denition 2.2.1 (Competitive Equilibrium). We say that (p; x; y) is a competitive equilibrium
i¤:
(1) Utility Maximization under the Budget Constraint: for all i 2M;
(i): Ii  pxi, where pxi =
PT
t=1 ptxit;
(ii): ui (xi; Ii   pxi)  ui (x0i; Ii   px0i) for all x0i 2 fe0; e1; : : :; eT g with Ii  px0i:
(2) Prot Maximization: for all t 2 N;
ptyt   ct(yt)  pty0t   ct(y0t) for all y0t 2 Z+:
(3) Balance of the Total Demand and Supply:
X
i2M xi =
XT
t=1
yte
t:
Note that since each xi is a T -dimensional vector and each yt is a scalar, we need to
multiply yt by et: Note also that by assumption B2, condition (2) can be rewritten asmct(yt 
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1)  pt  mct(yt) for all t 2 N .2 We abbreviate competitive equilibrium as c.e.
Kaneko (1982) and Kaneko and Yamamoto (1986) prove the existence of a c.e. in (M;N).
Theorem 2.2.2 (Existence). There exists a c.e. (p; x; y) in (M;N):
We denote the set of all c.e. in (M;N) by C. We say that a pair (x; y) is a competitive
allocation i¤ (p; x; y) 2 C for some p 2 RT+: Let AC be the set of all competitive allocations
in (M;N). We say that p is a competitive price vector i¤ (p; x; y) 2 C for some (x; y) 2 AC :
Let PC be the set of all competitive price vectors in (M;N). Note that every competitive
equilibrium is Pareto e¢ cient in (M;N) (see Appendix A).
Various authors have studied the structure of the set of c.e./core in assignment mar-
kets with/without quasi-linearity (QL) for utility functions. In Shapley-Shubiks assignment
model without the assumption QL, the core coincides with the set of competitive allocations,
while in GAM model, the latter is included in the core. The converse does not necessarily
hold. Kaneko (1982) gave a su¢ cient condition for the equivalence between the core and the
set of c.e., namely that for each seller j 2 Nt; there is another seller j0 who is of the same
type as j (Theorem 10, p. 227). It is also known that, in the assignment model with QL, the
set of competitive price vectors has a lattice structure, which guarantees the existence of the
maximum and minimum competitive price vectors (cf. Shapley and Shubik, 1972; Mishra
and Talman,2010). GAM model also satises that the set PC is lattice (cf. Miyake, 1994).
We conclude this section by stating incentive compatibility of our market model. Incentive
compatibility is studied in a eld of auction theory.3 The most related study is Demange and
Gale (1985). The authors proved that in Shapley and Shubiks assignment game without QL,
an allocation rule to select a minimum competitive equilibrium satises strategy-proofness
for buyers.4 Recent research by Serizawa and Morimoto (2015) proved that in Demange and
Gales model without sellers, an allocation rule to select a minimum competitive equilibrium
is the only rule to satisfy strategy-proofness. Since the assumption for buyers in GAM is
same as Demange and Gales model, we can directly extend their results, i.e., in the GAM
model, an allocation rule to select a minimum competitive equilibrium is the only rule to
satisfy strategy-proofness for buyers.
2We stipulate mct( 1) = 0:
3 In auction theory, trades are considered to be held one-shot. In such a one-shot trade, agents have
incentives to disguise with their own preferences to inuence the nal outcome. Therefore, it is an important
problem to study what rule which determine an allocation is compatible with such incentives.
4We give denitions. An allocation (or auction) rule is a function from the set of agentspreference proles
to the allocation. An allocation rule is strategy-proof i¤ it is a dominant strategy for each agent to announce
his true preferences.
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2.3 Characteristics of competitive equilibria
We present two theorems in Section 2.3.1. The rst theorem states that for each indivisible
good t, it separately holds that the multiplicity of competitive prices for good t implies a
unique equilibrium quantity for t. The second theorem is about the sizes of the sets of
competitive prices and allocations. We can separately evaluate the c.e. for each type of good
using both theorems. The proofs of these theorems will be given in Section 2.3.2.
2.3.1 The structure and size of competitive equilibria
For each t = 1; :::; T , we denote the sizes of the sets of competitive prices and competitive
allocations for indivisible good t by
t(PC) := maxf
pt   p0t : p; p0 2 PCg;
t(AC) := maxf
yt   y0t : (x; y); (x0; y0) 2 ACg:
Since PC and AC are compact sets under our assumptions, we can take the maximum value
for the above denition. When t(PC) > 0; there are at least two di¤erent competitive prices
for good t; and when t(PC) = 0; there is a unique competitive price. The other cases are
interpreted in a similar manner.
The rst theorem is about possible cases of t(PC) and t(AC). The proof will be given
in Section 2.3.2.
Theorem 2.3.1 (Non-simultaneous Multiplicity for Competitive Equilibria). Let t = 1; :::; T .
Then either (1), (2) or (3) holds:
(1) t(PC) > 0 and t(AC) = 0:
(2) t(PC) = 0 and t(AC) > 0:
(3) t(PC) = 0 and t(AC) = 0:
The theorem is equivalent to the statement that t(PC) > 0 implies t(AC) = 0 (and
t(AC) > 0 implies t(PC) = 0). Theorem 2.3.1.(1)-(3) correspond to Cases 1-3 in Fig.
2.1. As in Fig. 2.1, Theorem 2.3.1 is clear in the GAM without commodity di¤erentiation
(T = 1). Theorem 2.3.1 states that even if we allow commodity di¤erentiation (T > 1),
non-simultaneous multiplicity of competitive prices and quantities holds separately for each
good. Note that assertion (3) has two subcases: Fig. 2.1, Case 3 depicts one subcase of (3),
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where the supply schedule has a at part. In the other subcase, the demand schedule has a
at part.
Theorem 2.3.1 is related to Mishra and Talman (2010), Theorem 6, p.14.5 They studied
the structure of the set of c.e. in an assignment market with the QL assumption and the no-
seller assumption meaning that indivisible goods are assumed to be already supplied. Their
theorem states that PC has an interior point if and only if there exists a unique e¢ cient
allocation. The no-seller assumption is essential for the if part: it may not hold in the presence
of sellers. Fig. 2.1, Case 3 is a counterexample for this, where the price and allocation are
uniquely determined. The only-if part can directly be compared to our Theorem 2.3.1. It
follows from Theorem 2.3.1 that if t(PC) > 0 for any t = 1; :::; T; then the competitive
allocation is uniquely determined.
Using Theorem 2.3.1, we evaluate the sizes of the sets PC and AC for good t. For this
evaluation, when the equilibrium quantity for good t is unique, i.e., t(AC) = 0, we denote it
by yt :When t(PC) = 0, we denote the price by pt : As stated in Theorem 2.3.1, the su¢ cient
condition for t(AC) = 0 (t(PC) = 0, respectively) is t(PC) > 0 (t(AC) > 0). The proof of
Theorem 2.3.2 is given in Section 2.3.2.
Theorem 2.3.2 (The Size of the Set of Competitive Equilibria). Let t = 1; :::; T . Then,
(1) t(PC) > 0 implies mct(yt   1)  pt  mct(yt ) for all p 2 PC :
(2) t(AC) > 0 implies t(AC)  jfyt 2 Z+ : pt = mct(yt)gj and pt = mct(byt), wherebyt := minfyt 2 Z+ : (x; y) 2 ACg:6
Assertion (1) states that if there are multiple competitive prices for good t; then all the
competitive prices of good t are bounded by the marginal costs mct(yt   1) and mct(yt ): (2)
states that if there are multiple equilibrium quantities for good t; then t(AC) is restricted by
the condition of seller ts marginal costs. Although (2) allows multiple equilibrium quantities
for good t, the magnitude of multiplicity is expected to be rather small. For example, if the
cost function ct is strictly convex, then (2) implies t(AC)  1: The additional pt = mct(byt)
means that the competitive price of good t is the marginal cost mct(byt). In sum, even if there
are multiple competitive prices or quantities, they are not distantly located.
5Theorem 6 of Mishra and Talman (2010) is based on Theorem 5 of them. Theorem 5 is more specic; it
states that p 2 PC is an interior point if and only if each good is demanded by a unique buyer and every buyer
demands exactly one good. Since our model eliminates the QL assumption and takes sellers explicitly, their
proof of Theorem 5 cannot be directly applied to our model. Nevertheless, we conjecture that this theorem
can be extended to our model.
6 jXj is the cardinality of the set X.
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2.3.2 Proofs of Theorems 2.3.1 and 2.3.2
We give proofs of Theorems 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. First we start with the following lemmas.
Lemma 2.3.3. Let (p; x; y); (p0; x0; y0) 2 C and t = 1; :::; T: Then pt < p0t implies yt  y0t:
Proof. We have ptyt ct(yt)  pty0t ct(y0t) and p0ty0t ct(y0t)  p0tyt ct(yt) by seller ts prot
maximization condition. By these inequalities, we have ptyt + p0ty0t  pty0t + p0tyt: Hence, we
obtain yt(pt   p0t)  y0t(pt   p0t): This inequality, together with pt < p0t implies yt  y0t:
Lemma 2.3.4. Let (p; x; y); (p0; x0; y0) 2 C, t 6= t0 and suppose pt  p0t and pt0 < p0t0 : Then
there is no i 2M such that xi = et and x0i = et
0
:
Proof. Let pt  p0t:We suppose that xi = et and x0i = et
0
for some i 2M: It su¢ ces to show
that pt0  p0t0 : By utility maximization for i; we have
ui(e
t; Ii   pt)  ui(et0 ; Ii   pt0) and ui(et0 ; Ii   p0t0)  ui(et; Ii   p0t): (1.2)
Since pt  p0t; we have, by Assumption A1, ui(et; Ii   p0t)  ui(et; Ii   pt): This, together
with the the rst inequality of (1.2), implies ui(et; Ii   p0t)  ui(et
0
; Ii   pt0): Also the second
inequality implies that ui(et
0
; Ii p0t0)  ui(et
0
; Ii pt0): By Assumption A1, we have pt0  p0t0 :
We get the following lemma from Lemmas 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.
Lemma 2.3.5. Let (p; x; y); (p0; x0; y0) 2 C and t = 1; :::; T: Then pt 6= p0t implies yt = y0t:
Proof. Suppose pt < p0t: We show yt = y0t: Let
K = fk : 1  k  T; pk < p0kg and L = f1; :::; TgnK:
It follows from Lemma 2.3.3 that yk  y0k for all k 2 K: Hence,
P
k2K yk 
P
k2K y
0
k: If the
converse of this inequality holds, then yk = y0k should be the case for all k 2 K: Hence, it
su¢ ces to show that
P
k2K yk 
P
k2K y
0
k:
Now, let
M(K) = fi 2M : xi = ek for some k 2 Kg;
M(L) = fi 2M : xi = el for some l 2 Lg;
M 0(K) = fi 2M : x0i = ek for some k 2 Kg:
Then fM(K);M(L); fi 2 M : xi = e0gg is a partition of M . Now let us show M(K) 
M 0(K): By Lemma 2.3.4, for any l 2 L and k 2 K; there is no i 2 M such that xi = el
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and x0i = e
k; i.e., M(L) \M 0(K) = ;: Furthermore, by Assumption A1 and pk < p0k for any
k 2 K; there is no i 2M such that xi = e0 and x0i = ek; i.e., fi 2M : xi = e0g\M 0(K) = ;:
Since M(K)[M(L)[ fi 2M : xi = e0g =M is a partition of M; we have M(K) M 0(K).
By the condition of the balance of total demand and supply, we have jM(K)j =Pk2K yk
and jM 0(K)j = Pk2K y0k: By the above inclusion result, we have Pk2K yk = jM(K)j 
jM 0(K)j =Pk2K y0k:
We now prove Theorems 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.
Proof of Theorem 2.3.1. We prove the following equivalent assertion: t(PC) > 0 implies
t(AC) = 0: Suppose t(PC) > 0, i.e., there exist (p1; x1; y1); (p2; x2; y2) 2 C such that
p1t > p
2
t . By Lemma 2.3.5, we have y
1
t = y
2
t : Let (p; x; y) 2 C. Again, by Lemma 2.3.5,
yt = y
2
t if pt = p
1
t ; yt = y
1
t if pt 6= p1t . Thus, the equilibrium quantity of good t is unique, i.e.,
t(AC) = 0:
Proof of Theorem 2.3.2.(1). t(PC) > 0 implies t(AC) = 0 by Theorem 2.3.1. Let yt be
the unique equilibrium quantity for good t: Let p 2 PC . Then we have mct(yt   1)  pt 
mct(y

t ) by seller ts prot maximization condition.
Proof of (2). t(AC) > 0 implies t(PC) = 0 by Theorem 2.3.1. Let pt be the unique
competitive price for good t. Suppose, on the contrary, t(AC) > jfyt 2 Z+ : mct(yt) = pt gj:
Let n = jfyt 2 Z+ : mct(yt) = pt gj: Let (x; y); (x0; y0) 2 AC with y0t+n+1  yt: Then we have
mct(yt  1)  pt  mct(y0t) by seller ts prot maximization condition: This and Assumption
B2 imply that pt = mct(y0t) =    = mct(y0t+n): Thus, we obtain jfyt 2 Z+ : mct(yt) = pt gj 
n+ 1; which contradicts the denition of n.
We now prove pt = mct(byt). Let byt = minfyt 2 Z+ : (x; y) 2 ACg: Then we have pt 
mct(byt) by the seller ts prot maximization condition. On the other hand, let (x1; y1) 2 AC
with y1t  byt + 1: Similarly, we have mct(y1t   1)  pt : This and Assumption B2 imply
mct(byt)  pt :
2.4 Di¢ culties in extending Theorem 2.3.1
In Section 2.3, we presented two theorems on the structure of the set of c.e. in GAM model.
The main theorem is Theorem 2.3.1, and the other is obtained based on this theorem. The
key assumption is that each buyer wants at most one unit of an indivisible good. Here, we
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consider whether Theorem 2.3.1 could be preserved in markets where each buyer may demand
more than one unit of an indivisible good.
In the literature on markets with indivisible goods, the following conditions are typi-
cally used: Quasi-linearity (QL) and gross substitutability (GS). Under those conditions,
it is known (cf., Kelso and Crawford, 1982; Gul and Stacchetti, 1999) that a market with
indivisibilities has a c.e. In fact, we see that Theorem 2.3.1 can be extended under the QL
condition. Without the QL condition, but with the GS condition, we give a counterexample
for the extension of Theorem 2.3.1. We also give another example having no c.e. under the
GS condition.
We consider a market model (M;N) that is the same as a GAM model, but with the
assumption that each buyer may demand more than one unit of an indivisible good. Each
buyer i 2 M has a utility function ui dened on A  R+, where A  ZT+. We dene the
individual demand correspondence Di : RT+  A as:
Di(p) := fx : x 2 Bi(p) and ui (x; Ii   px)  ui
 
x0; Ii   px0

for all x0 2 Bi(p)g;
where Bi(p) := fx : x 2 A and Ii  pxg:Then the GS and QL conditions are dened by the
following manner.
Condition QL (Quasi-linearity). The utility function is expressed as ui(x; d) = vi(x) + d
for all (x; d) 2 A R+ for some vi : A! R.
Condition GS (Gross substitutability). For any p; p0 2 RT+ with p  p0 and for any x 2 Di(p),
there exists x0 2 Di(p0) such that xt  x0t for all t with pt = p0t.
In QL, the function vi() is interpreted as the valuation price for consumption of indivisible
goods. GS states that when the prices for some goods increase from p, the demands for the
other goods remain the same or increase.
Under Condition QL, Theorem 2.3.1 can be directly extended:
Proposition 2.4.1. Let (M;N) be an extended GAM model satisfying condition QL, and
let t = 1; :::; T , (p; x; y); (p0; x0; y0) 2 C: Then pt 6= p0t implies yt = y0t:
Proof. Since (p; x; y) is a c.e., it holds that for each i 2M , vi(xi)+(Ii pxi)  vi(x0i)+(Ii 
px0i): Thus,
P
i2M (vi(xi) pxi) 
P
i2M (vi(x
0
i) px0i): Also, it holds that
P
i2M (vi(x
0
i) p0x0i)
Pi2M vi((xi) p0xi): By adding each side of the latter two inequalities, we have p[Pi2M x0i
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 Pi2M xi]  p0[Pi2M x0i  Pi2M xi]: Since the market is balanced (Denition 2.2.1.(3)),
this inequality is equivalent to
p(y0   y)  p0(y0   y) (1.3)
Since the seller side is the same as a GAM model in Section 3, we can apply Lemma 2.3.3.
By this, we have yt  y0t for all t with pt < p0t: This and Eq. (1.3) imply yt = y0t for all t with
pt 6= p0t:
Proposition 2.4.1 is the same claim as Lemma 2.3.5 of Section 2.3, which implies The-
orem 2.3.1. Thus, Theorem 2.3.1 holds under Condition QL, independent of the existence
of a competitive equilibrium. Under QL, Condition GS is known as a su¢ cient condition
for the existence of a c.e. Under QL, but without GS, Kelso and Crawford (1982) gave a
counterexample for the existence of a c.e.
For our study of markets with indivisible goods, it would be more appropriate to eliminate
Condition QL since we aim to apply our study to markets including housing and car markets;
each indivisible unit is large relative to the expenditure of a household. In such markets,
income e¤ects are non-negligible, but QL ignores these (cf. Kaneko and Wooders, 2004 for
further explanations on QL).
Now, we focus on the extendibility of Theorem 2.3.1 without assuming Condition QL.
Here, we give a counterexample where Theorem 2.3.1 fails without QL, even in the case of
one indivisible good. At the same time, this example satises Condition GS in the trivial
sense.
Example 2.4.2 (Failure of Theorem 2.3.1 ). Consider a market with one buyer 10 and one
seller 1. Buyer 10 has an initial income I10 = 5; and may demand at most two units of the
indivisible good. His utility function u10 : f0; 1; 2g  R+ ! R is given by
u10(x; d) =
8><>: 2x+ d if x  1; d  4;2 + 2x+ 1
2
d if x  1; d > 4:
u10(2; d) =
8><>: 3:5 + d if d  2;4:5 + 1
2
d if d > 2:
For each x, the function u10(x; d) is continuous with respect to d: for each x = 0; 1 (or 2),
u10(x; d) kinks at d = 4 (d = 2). The marginal utility from d decreases at the kink. Thus,
this function is concave with respect to d. In fact, it is also concave with respect to x for
each d; for example, when d = 2; u10(1; 2)   u10(0; 2) = 2 > 1:5 = u10(2; 2)   u10(1; 2): For
each x = 0; 1; 2; function u10 is depicted in Fig. 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Buyers utility function in Ex. 2.4.2.
Figure 2.3: Demand and supply schedules in Ex. 2.4.2.
The sellers cost function is given by c1(0) = 0; c1(1) = 0:9, c1(2) = 2:3; c1(3) = large.
In this example, the supply schedule is expressed as a step function, shown by the gray curve
in Fig. 2.3, in the same way as in Fig. 2.1: the price for the second step is 2:3   0:9 = 1:4,
which is a competitive price. However, the demand schedule is not a simple step function:
for each price p with 1  p  1:5, the demand schedule takes two values, that is, it forms the
rectangle with 1  p  1:5 and x = 1; 2; as depicted in Fig. 2.3. We see that the set of c.e.
is given by
f(p; 1; 1) : 1  p  1:4g [ f(p; 2; 2) : 1:4  p  1:5g:
Thus, we have multiple competitive prices and multiple competitive quantities. This implies
that Theorem 2.3.1 fails, since D10(p) = f1; 2g for 1  p  1:5. Indeed, for p with 1  p  1:5,
u10(1; 5  p) = u10(2; 5  2p) = 7  p > 4:5 = u10(0; 5).
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Without Condition QL, but with GS, the existence of a c.e. is not necessarily guaranteed;
we show this with an example of one indivisible good that also satises GS in the trivial
sense.
Example 2.4.3 (Non-existence of competitive equilibria). Consider a market with one buyer
10 and one seller 1. Buyer 10 has an initial income I10 = 4; and may demand at most two
units of the indivisible good. His utility function u10 : f0; 1; 2g  R+ ! R is given by
u10(0; d) =
8><>: d if d  4;8
3
+
1
3
d if d > 4:
u10(1; d) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1:9 + d if d  2;
2:9 +
1
2
d if 2 < d  4;
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+
1
3
d if d > 4:
u10(2; d) =
8><>: 3:8 + d if d  1;67
15
+
1
3
d if d > 1:
For each xed x, the function u10(x; d) is continuous in d, and since the marginal utility from
d decreases at the kink, the function is concave in d. For a xed d, u10(x; d) is concave with
respect to x. For each x = 0; 1; 2; Fig. 2.4 depicts function u10 .
Figure 2.4: Buyers utility function in Ex. 2.4.3.
The sellers cost function is given by c1(0) = 0; c1(1) = 1:5 and c1(2) =large. Fig.
2.5 shows the demand and supply schedules, which both are step functions. The quantity
supplied is always 1 at price p > 1:5. Since D10(p) = f0g for p > 1:9 and D10(p) = f2g
for p < 1:9; the candidate equilibrium price must be p = 1:9, but 1 =2 D10(1:9). Indeed, for
p = 1:9; u10(2; 4 2p) = u10(0; 4) = 4 > 3:95 = u10(1; 4 p); meaning that 0 or 2 to 1 is strictly
preferred. The demand schedule has a hole at (p; y) = (1:9; 1). Thus, the above example has
no c.e.
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Figure 2.5: Demand and supply schedules in Ex. 2.4.3.
Let us see how the demand schedule has a hole at (p; y) = (1:9; 1):
Figure 2.6: Buyers indi¤erence set and budget line at p = 1:9 in Ex. 2.4.3.
Fig. 2.6 depicts the buyers indi¤erence curve, f(x; d) 2 f0; 1; 2g  R+ : u10(x; d) =
4g = f(0; 4); (1; 2:2); (2; 0:2)g, and the budget line at p = 1:9. This indi¤erence curve is non-
convex, while function satises the convexity for each x and d: Bundles (0; 4) and (2; 0:2)
are on the budget line, however, (1; 2:2) is an exterior of the budget line. Thus, the demand
correspondence has a hole at (p; y) = (1:9; 1):
2.5 Aggregation of sellers and shrinkage of competitive prices
In the previous discussion, we assumed Eq. (1.1): Nt = ftg for all t = 1; :::; T , i.e., only one
seller provides indivisible goods of type t. In this section, we present that the assumption of
(1.1) does not loose any generality in the consideration of c.e. This result allows us to consider
markets with many sellers while preserving Theorems 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. As an application of
our Theorems 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, we also show the shrinkage result on competitive prices where
the market gets dense with sellers.
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2.5.1 Aggregation of sellers
Here, we show how the set Nt is aggregated into one seller ftg.
Let (M;N) be the original assignment market without (1.1), i.e., jNtj  1 for all t =
1; :::; T , where each landlord j 2 Nt provides indivisible goods of type-t with the cost function
cj : Z+ ! R+ satisfying Assumptions B1 and B2. Now, let No = f1; :::; Tg be the set of
aggregated sellers. Our problem is to dene the cost function ect of each aggregated seller
t 2 No preserving the structure of c.e. in (M;N):
The following theorem explains the equivalence of c.e. between (M;N) and (M;No):
Theorem 2.5.1 (Aggregation of Sellers). Let (M;N) be an assignment market without re-
quiring (1.1). There exist cost functions ect : Z+ ! R+ satisfying Assumption B1 and B2 for
t 2 No such that,
(1) if (p; x; y) is a c.e. in (M;N); then there is a ey 2 ZT+ such that (p; x; ey) is a c.e. in
(M;No):
(2) if (p; x; ey) is a c.e. in (M;No); then there is a y 2 Zn+ such that (p; x; y) is a c.e. in
(M;N):
The set Nt for type t is aggregated into ftg : the essential part is to dene the aggregated
cost function ect satisfying Assumptions B1 and B2. Once this ect is appropriately dened, (1)
the supplies fyjgj2Nt are aggregated into eyt =Pj2Nt yj and this aggregation makes a c.e. in
(M;No); (2) the aggregated eyt is divided into fyjgj2Nt and this makes a c.e. in (M;N).
We now construct the aggregated cost function. Let us x an arbitrary t 2 No. For each
j 2 Nt, dene the sequence fmcj(y) : y 2 Z+g:7 By Assumption B2, this is an increasing
sequence. We then generate the new increasing sequence ffmct(y) : y 2 Z+g by reordering all
the components of the set of sequences ffmcj(y) : y 2 Z+g : j 2 Ntg in the ascending order:
in the start, we choose the smallest one from fmcj(0) : j 2 Ntg. If we choose mcj0(0) here,
we next choose the smallest one from ffmcj(0) : yj 2 Z+g : j 2 Ntnfj0gg [ fmcj0(1)g. The
following shows an example of the construction of fmct with jNtj = 3.
mc1(0)  mc2(0)  mc1(1)  mc3(0)  mc2(1)  mc2(2)   
# # # # # #
fmct(0) fmct(1) fmct(2) fmct(3) fmct(4) fmct(5)   
7mcj(yj) = cj(yj + 1)  cj(yj):
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By using ffmct(y) : y 2 Z+g, we dene the cost function of aggregated seller t, ect : Z+ !
R+ by ect(0) = 0 and ect(y) =Pky 1 fmct(k) for y 2 Z+nf0g. This ect satises Assumptions B1
and B2. We can then show Theorem 2.5.1. In the proof, we stipulatemcj( 1) = fmct( 1) = 0.
Proof of (1). Let (p; x; y) be a c.e. in (M;N) and t 2 No. By the prot maximization
condition, mcj(yj   1)  pt  mcj(yj) for every j 2 Nt.
Let eyt =Pj2Nt yj . By the denition of ffmct(y) : y 2 Z+g, it holds that
fmct(eyt   1) = maxj2Nt [mcj(yj   1)]; (1.4)
fmct(eyt) = minj2Nt [mcj(yj)]:
Eqs. (1.4) and the above prot maximization condition imply fmct(eyt 1)  pt  fmct(eyt), that
is, the aggregated seller t maximizes his prot with production unit eyt. Since t is arbitrarily
chosen, a triple (p; x; (ey1; :::; eyT )) is a c.e. in (M;No).
Proof of (2). Let (p; x; ey) be a c.e. in (M;No) and t 2 No. By the prot maximization
condition, fmct(eyt   1)  pt  fmct(eyt).
By the denition of ffmct(y) : y 2 Z+g, there exist fyjgj2Nt such that
yj 2 arg min
y2Z+
[mcj(y) : fmct(eyt)  mcj(y)] for j 2 Nt;P
j2Nt yj = eyt.
For eyt and fyjgj2Nt , the same equalities as Eqs. (1.4) holds. Eqs. (1.4) and the above
prot maximization condition imply mcj(yj   1)  pt  mcj(yj) for all j 2 Nt, that is, each
seller j maximizes his prot with production unit yj . Since t is arbitrarily chosen, a triple
(p; x; ffyjgj2Ntgt2No) is a c.e. in (M;N).
2.5.2 Shrinkage of competitive prices
The following passage is from Shapley and Shubik (1972) (pp. 127-128):
If the number of traders is increased on both sides of the market, in such a way
that their valuations for the products brought to market become more and more
diverse (but remain bounded in a suitable sense), then the core will tend to shrink
in size.
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In the context of this paper, the set of competitive price vectors corresponds to the core. The
paper asserts that this shrinkage is easily obtained for the case of homogeneous goods. It
continues:
In the more general model, however, the increasing dimensionality of the solution
and the space in which it is dened make a precise discussion of the shrinkage
phenomenon more di¢ cult.
Here, we analyze their observation. For this, we eliminate assumption (1.1), that is, we have
multiple sellers for type t. This allows us to consider the situation where the number of traders
is increased. Nevertheless, we still use the aggregated cost function ect to apply Theorems 2.3.1
and 2.3.2.
We consider a sequence of assignment markets f(M ; N)g+1=1. Let t = 1; :::; T . We
express the idea of Shapley and Shubik (1972) quoted above in terms of f(M ; N)g+1=1 as
follows:
Condition Dt (Denseness of Marginal Costs). There are some constants t and t (0 <
t < t) such that for any ; (M
 ; N) satises
(1) jNt j ! 1 as  !1;
(2) t  fmct (yt)  t for all yt  jM j;
(3) max
1ytjM j
[fmct (yt)  fmct (yt   1)]  (t   t)= jNt j :
Condition Dt.(2) states that the aggregated marginal costs, fmct (yt), are in the same
interval (bounded) for the relevant domains, though the size of (M ; N) becomes large. (3)
states that the marginal costs are densely distributed for large . However, (1) requires only
the number of sellers of type t, jNt j, to become large: the number of buyers, jM j, may be
bounded, but it would be natural to require it to become large proportionally to jNt j.
The graphical illustration of Condition Dt is given by Fig. 2.7. The marginal costs
are distributed in the same interval: when the market is small ( = 1), the distribution of
marginal costs is sparse; and when the market is large (large ), the distribution becomes
dense.
Let PC be the set of all competitive price vectors in (M ; N) for   1.
Theorem 2.5.2 (Shrinkage of Competitive Prices). Let f(M ; N)g+1=1 be a sequence of
GAM satisfying Condition D t: Then t(PC)! 0 as  !1:
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Figure 2.7: An illustration of Condition Dt.
Although the theorem claims that the size of the set of competitive prices shrinks to
zero, it does not imply that the set PC converges to a price vector, i.e., PC may uctuate
and have multiple limit points. In this paper, we do not have a limit model of the sequence
f(M ; N)g+1=1. If one wants to have such a model, a candidate for it is the assignment
market model with a continuum of buyers and sellers given by Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame
(1999), or the f -core model by Kaneko and Wooders (1996). However, it is the point of
Theorem 2.5.2 that for a large and dense market, the competitive prices are almost uniquely
determined.
To prove this theorem, we restate Theorem 2.3.2.(1). Let pmaxt := maxfpt : p 2 PCg and
pmint := minfpt : p 2 PCg:8 By denition; we have t(PC) = pmaxt   pmint : Then, we restate
Theorem 2.3.2.(1) as follows:
If t(PC) > 0; then t(PC) = pmaxt   pmint  mct(yt ) mct(yt   1): (1.5)
Using (1.5), we can prove the above theorem.
Proof. Let  be an arbitrary natural number, and let t(PC) > 0 and yt be the unique
equilibrium quantity for good t in (M ; N): By (1.5) and yt  jM j, we have t(PC) fmct (yt ) fmct (yt  1)  max1ytjM j[fmct (yt) fmct (yt 1)]: This inequality, together with
Condition Dt imply that t(PC)  (t   t)= jNt j, and the right hand side of the inequality
tends to zero as  !1.
8Since the set of competitive price vectors PC is a compact set, these maximum and minimum are well
dened.
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Theorem 2.5.2 states the shrinkage result for a xed type t:When Condition Dt holds for
all t = 1; :::; T; we get the shrinkage result for the competitive price vector set PC . Although
they indicated a possible di¢ culty caused from higher dimensionality for the heterogeneous
goods case, our Theorems 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 guarantee that it is su¢ cient to treat each indivisible
good separately.
As mentioned in Section 2.2, Kaneko (1982) provided a su¢ cient condition for the core
to coincide with the set of c.e. This su¢ cient condition holds naturally for a large and dense
market. Thus, we obtain the shrinkage result for the core.
As stated above, Gretsky et al. (1999) gave an assignment market model with a continuum
of buyers and sellers with Condition QL. They show the generic uniqueness of an equilibrium
price vector. Theorem 2.5.2 may be regarded as a nite version of their theorem, without
QL. Thus, we conjecture their result for the continuum assignment market without QL.
2.6 Conclusions
We have studied the structure of the set of competitive equilibria in the GAM model. The
main result (Theorem 2.3.1) states that if there are multiple competitive prices for indivisible
good t, the equilibrium quantity for t is uniquely determined; and that if there are multiple
equilibrium quantities for t, the competitive price for t is uniquely determined. This result
enables us to study the relationship between competitive prices and quantities for each indi-
visible good t. From this result, we obtained Theorem 2.3.2 evaluating the sizes of competitive
price and quantity sets for each good t.
In Section 2.4, we discussed di¢ culties in extending Theorem 2.3.1 to a market model
where each buyer may demand more than one unit of an indivisible good. We showed that
under the quasi-linear utility assumption for buyers, Theorem 2.3.1 can be extended. Without
quasi-linearity, however, we gave an example satisfying gross substitutability where Theorem
2.3.1 fails. Furthermore, we gave an example satisfying gross substitutability, but having no
competitive equilibria.
In Section 2.5.1, we showed the aggregation result of the sellers, i.e., it is su¢ cient to
consider models where, for each type t, a single seller provides units of indivisible good t. This
aggregation can be made as far as competitive equilibria are concerned. We also presented
in Section 2.5.2, the shrinkage theorem of competitive prices when the market becomes large
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and dense with sellers.
We may apply the GAM model to rental housing markets and/or second-hand automobile
markets. Those markets are typically dense in the sense that the numbers of sellers and buyers
are large and there are many similar sellers and buyers. Kaneko (1983) and Kaneko, Ito and
Osawa (2006) adopted the GAM model for the analysis of rental housing markets, making
some assumptions specic to their studies. By Theorems 2.3.2 and 2.5.2, the competitive
prices are restrictive and hence their studies could be done under more general assumptions.
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Chapter 3
Evaluation of Competitive Price
Vectors in Markets with
Indivisibilities
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we evaluate competitive price vectors in housing markets with indivisibilities.
This market is an application model of the generalized assignment market (GAM) by Kaneko
(1982). In the market, the agents are divided into buyers and sellers, the objects to be traded
(houses) are treated as indivisible goods and classied into nite categories, and each buyer
demands at most one unit of an indivisible good. It is known that there exists a competitive
equilibrium while it may not be uniquely determined. In particular, there exist the maximum
and minimum competitive price vectors.
As with the general equilibrium model, this non-uniqueness brings a problem to applica-
tions of this model in comparative statics. Fig. 3.1 depicts a supply and demand schedules in
the market without commodity di¤erentiation. The intersection of two schedules constitutes
the set of competitive equilibria. Since any p 2 pmin; pmax is a candidate for an equilibrium
price, a comparative statics result may di¤er depending on price p. This problem is inherited
to the market with commodity di¤erentiation.
To clear this problem, we evaluate the di¤erence between the maximum and minimum
competitive price vectors. Here, we introduce a summary of one of our evaluation results,
Theorem 3.3.4 in Section 3.3.2. Theorem 3.3.4 states that the di¤erence between the max-
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Figure 3.1: A supply and demand schedules without commodity di¤erentiation.
imum and minimum competitive price vectors is bounded by the income di¤erence of two
specic income-neighboring buyers. This implies that the price di¤erence is considered to
be small, and this tendency is remarkable when the number of buyers is large and its in-
come distribution gets dense. Thus, as far as a quasi large market is concerned, we can see
that comparative statics results are approximately the same whether we use any equilibrium
price vectors. To conrm our results, in Section 3.4, we give three numerical examples and
shrinkage result on di¤erential price vectors.
In our analyses, the maximum (minimum, respectively) competitive price (rent) vector
is calculated as the solution of the specic system of equations. This system of equations
is constructed from buyers indi¤erence conditions. The important assumptions for this
approach are homogeneous utility function and normality of the quality of indivisible
objects.
Our evaluation results are related to Sai (2014) studying the structure of the set of com-
petitive equilibria under weaker conditions. One of his result is that the di¤erence between the
maximum and minimum competitive price vectors is characterized by the di¤erence in sellers
marginal costs. On the other hand, we characterize the di¤erence by household incomes.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 formulates our market model and gives our
denition of competitive equilibrium. Section 3.3 rst introduces two systems of equations
from which we can derive two representative solutions for the maximum and minimum com-
petitive price vectors. This section then outlines the main results of our study. Section 3.4
provides some numerical examples and an application of our theorems. Section 3.5 presents
concluding remarks.
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3.2 The market model
This section introduces the rental housing market model of Kaneko et al. (2006). In Section
3.2.1, we give our basic assumptions and the denition of competitive equilibrium. In Section
3.2.2, we introduce additional assumptions that facilitate our study.
3.2.1 General formulation
The rental housing market is denoted by (M;N), where M = f1; : : : ;mg denotes the set of
households, and N = f10; : : : ; n0g denotes the set of landlords. The apartments are classied
into nite categories 1; 2; :::; T .
Each household i 2M initially has an income Ii > 0 but no dwelling. The household wants
to rent at most one apartment unit paying rent from his income. Without loss of generality,
we can assume that the households are ordered in their incomes as I1  I2      Im. The
consumption set is written by X := fe0; e1; : : : ; eT gR+; where ek is the T -dimensional unit
vector with ekk = 1 (e
0 = 0), and R+ is the set of nonnegative real numbers. A consumption
vector (ek; c) 2 X with k 6= 0 means that household i rents one unit of the k-th category
of an apartment and enjoys the consumption c = Ii   pk, where pk is the rent of the k-th
apartment. For k = 0, no apartment is consumed. An initial endowment of i 2 M is given
as (e0; Ii) with Ii > 0.
A utility function of household i is given by ui : X ! R: We make the following assump-
tion.
Assumption A. For each i 2 M and x 2 fe0; e1; : : : ; eT g; ui(xi; c) is a continuous and
strictly monotone function of c, and ui(e0; Ii) > ui(ek; 0) for all k = 1; :::; T:
The rst part of Assumption A allows a utility function to have an income e¤ect. An
inequality in the last part means the indispensability of money.
Each landlord j 2 N provides apartments of exactly one category (say k), but may provide
more than one unit. The landlord has a cost function Cj(yj) : Z+ ! R+; where Z+ is the set
of nonnegative integers. For each yj 2 Z+, Cj(yj) represents the cost (in terms of money) of
supplying yj units of the k-th category. We make the following assumption for Cj().
Assumption B. For each j 2 N; Cj(0) = 0 and Cj(yj+1) Cj(yj)  Cj(yj+2) Cj(yj+1)
for all yj 2 Z+:
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The rst part of Assumption B means that no xed cost is required for no production.
The last part is a discrete version of the standard convexity assumption on a cost function,
meaning that the marginal cost is increasing.
For notational simplicity, we assume that only one landlord k provides apartments in the
k-th category. Thus, the set N becomes f1; : : : ; Tg; and landlord k 2 N is the only landlord
providing the k-th apartments. As far as the competitive equilibrium is concerned, this can
be assumed without loss of generality.1
Let (p; x; y) = ((p1; : : : ; pT ); (x1; : : : ; xm); (y1; : : : ; yT )) be a triple of p 2 RT+; x 2 fe0; e1;
: : : ; eT gm and y 2 ZT+: The competitive equilibrium is dened by the following.
Denition 3.2.1. We say that a triple (p; x; y) is a competitive equilibrium i¤
(UM): for all i 2M;
(i) Ii   pxi  0;
(ii) ui(xi; Ii   pxi)  ui(x0i; Ii   px0i) for all x0i 2 fe0; e1; : : : ; eT g with Ii   px0i  0:
(PM): for all k = 1; :::; T; pkyk   Ck(yk)  pky0k   Ck(y0k) for all y0k 2 Z+:
(BDS):
P
i2M xi =
PT
k=1 yke
k:
Condition UM is utility maximization condition under the budget constraint of a house-
hold. PM is the prot maximization condition of a landlord. BDS means a balance of demand
and supply. Under Assumptions A and B, we have a competitive equilibrium in (M;N):
Theorem 3.2.2 (Kaneko, 1982; Kaneko and Yamamoto, 1986). There exists a competitive
equilibrium (p; x; y) in a rental housing market (M;N).
We say that p = (p1; : : : ; pT ) is a competitive rent vector i¤ (p; x; y) is a competitive
equilibrium for some x 2 f0; e1; : : : ; eT gm and y 2 ZT+: Note that in there exists multiple
competitive equilibria. In particular, the maximum and minimum competitive rent vectors
exist (denote them by pmax and pmin), which play an important role in our analysis.2
Theorem 3.2.3. There exist the maximum and minimum competitive rent vectors in (M;N).
The result close to Theorem 3.2.3 is found in Miyake (1994) or Demange and Gale (1985).
The complete proof of this theorem will be shown in Appendix B. We say that (p; x; y)
1Under this simplication, each seller is interpreted as the aggregated landlord. A detailed discussion is
given by Chapter 2, Section 2.5.1 [or Sai (2014), Section 5.1].
2A competitive rent vector p is the maximum (minimum) i¤ p  p0 (p  p0) for every competitive rent
vector p0.
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is a maximum (minimum) competitive equilibrium i¤ p is the maximum (minimum). By
denition, the maximum (minimum) competitive rent vector is uniquely determined, while
multiple maximum (minimum) competitive equilibria may exist. Kaneko et al. (2006) and
their subsequent papers (e.g. Ito (2007)) focused on a maximum competitive equilibrium and
used it for comparative statics analyses.
3.2.2 Specic assumptions for (M;N)
In addition to Assumptions A and B, we assume that every household has an identical utility
function:
Assumption C. ui(; ) = uj(; ) for all i; j 2M .
From now on, we simplify the utility function ui as u. In an urban economics context,
Assumption C implies that the housing market (M;N) represents a mono-centric city, and
all the households commute to an identical business district. Thus, under C, each household
is characterized only by his initial income. One may think Assumption C implies an identical
apartment preference for each household. However, this concern will be eliminated by the
next assumption.
Assumption D. If u(xi; c) = u(x0i; c
0); and c < c0; then u(xi; c + ) > u(x0i; c
0 + ) for any
 > 0:
Assumption D is the normality assumption on the quality of apartments. In D, apartment
xi is better than x0i because a household living in xi with a smaller consumption c is indi¤erent
to living in x0i with a larger consumption c
0. This implies that, for each household, the demand
shifts to a better apartment or remains the same if their income increases.
We also put another assumptions.
Assumption E. If u(xi; c) > u(x0i; c
0); then u(xi; c) = u(x0i; c
0 + ) for some  > 0:
Assumption F. u(e1; 0) > u(e2; 0) >    > u(eT ; 0):3
Assumption E means that housing quality of any apartment is substitutable for money.
Assumption F is regarding the quality of apartments. By Assumption F, the apartments are
numbered according to their quality level. The rst category is the best one and the T -th
category is the worst one.
3Assumption F together with A, D and E imply u(e1; c) > u(e2; c) >    > u(eT ; c) for all c 2 R+.
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3.3 Rent equations and the evaluation of competitive rent vec-
tors
In Section 3.3.1, we introduce two systems of equations: the upper and lower rent equations.
The solution of the upper (lower) rent equation is called the upper (lower) di¤erential rent
vector, corresponding to the maximum (minimum) competitive rent vector, under some con-
ditions. Using both di¤erential rent vectors, we present two theorems on the evaluation of
the di¤erence between the lower and upper di¤erential rent vectors in Section 3.3.2. Section
3.3.3 gives proofs of two theorems.
3.3.1 Rent equations and di¤erential rent vectors
Here, we give some lemmas and more detailed assumptions. The following lemma has an
important role in the derivation of the rent equation.
Lemma 3.3.1 (Kaneko et al., 2006). Let (p; x; y) be a competitive equilibrium. Then,
(1): If k0 < k and xi = ek for some i, then pk < pk0 :
(2): If xi = ek; xj = ek
0
and Ii > Ij for some i; j, then k  k0:
This lemma states that, in equilibrium, (1) the price of a better apartment is higher, and
(2) a household with a higher income rents a better apartment. Note that in (1), it may be
possible that no one rents an apartment in the k0-th category, while the k-th apartment is
rented by someone. To eliminate such a case, we assume that there is a category f dividing
the apartments into active categories and inactive categories:
Assumption G. Let (p; x; y) be a competitive equilibrium. There exists some category
f  T such that yk > 0 for k = 1; :::; f and yk = 0 for k = f; :::; T .
We call this f the marginal category.
Recall that all the set of households M = f1; :::;mg is ordered by their incomes as I1 
I2      Im. We next dene the household with the lowest income in each active category.
Let (p; x; y) be a competitive equilibrium. For each k = 1; :::; f , let
G(k) :=
kP
t=1
yt:
By Lemma 3.3.1.(2), G(k) is the household having the lowest income in the k-th category.
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We call G(k) the boundary household and IG(k) the boundary income of the k-th category.
Note that G(k) may also di¤er for di¤erent competitive equilibria.
We now introduce two systems of equations with unknowns (r1; :::; rf ):
Denition 3.3.2. (1) (Kaneko et al., 2006): We call the following system of equations the
upper rent equation:
u(ef 1; IG(f 1)   rf 1) = u(ef ; IG(f 1)   rf );
u(ef 2; IG(f 2)   rf 2) = u(ef 1; IG(f 2)   rf 1);
...
u(e1; IG(1)   r1) = u(e2; IG(1)   r2):
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
(2.1)
(2): We call the following system of equations the lower rent equation:
u(ef 1; IG(f 1)+1   rf 1) = u(ef ; IG(f 1)+1   rf );
u(ef 2; IG(f 2)+1   rf 2) = u(ef 1; IG(f 2)+1   rf 1);
...
u(e1; IG(1)+1   r1) = u(e2; IG(1)+1   r2):
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
(2.2)
Denition 3.3.2.(1) was introduced by Kaneko, et al. (2006). Each system of equations
has f unknowns, while this is constituted by f   1 equations. Eq. (2.1) states that boundary
household G(k) is indi¤erent between renting the k+1-th apartment at rent rk+1 and renting
the k-th apartment at rent rk. The di¤erence between Eqs. (2.1) and (2.2) is the replacement
of the boundary income IG(k) by IG(k)+1. In Eq. (2.1) (Eq. (2.2), respectively), if rf is given,
then the unknown rf 1 is uniquely determined by the rst equation. In the same manner,
the remaining unknowns rf 2; :::; r1 are recursively determined. We say that a solution of Eq.
(2.1) is an upper di¤erential rent vector and denote it by (r1; :::; rf ); a solution of Eq. (2.2)
is a lower di¤erential rent vector and denote it by (r1; :::; rf ). In particular, if rf is given
with u(e1; 0) < u(ef ; IG(f 1)   rf ) an upper di¤erential rent vector is uniquely determined
and satises r1 >    > rf 1 > rf .4
We then have the following relations for a di¤erential rent vector and a competitive rent
vector.
4A lower di¤erential rent vector is also uniequely determined under a similar condition. See Kaneko et al.
(2006), Lemma 2.5.
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Figure 3.2: An illustration of Theorem 3.3.3.
Theorem 3.3.3.(1) Let (p; x; y) be a maximum competitive equilibrium and (r1; :::; rf ) be the
upper di¤erential rent vector determined by rf = pf . Then rk  pk for all k = 1; :::; f   1:
(2) Let (p; x; y) be a minimum competitive equilibrium and (r1; :::; rf ) be the lower di¤erential
rent vector determined by rf = pf . Then rk  pk for all k = 1; :::; f   1:
Proof is in Appendix B. Theorem 3.3.3 states that the upper and lower di¤erential rent
vectors correspond to an upper and lower bounds of the set of competitive rent vectors,
respectively. An illustration of Theorem 3.3.3 is given by Fig. 3.2: in Fig. 3.2, the vertical
axis (price) is continuous, while the horizontal axis (category) is discrete.
Kaneko et al. (2006) provided two su¢ cient conditions for an upper di¤erential rent
vector to coincide with the maximum competitive rent vector. We can also expect a similar
condition for a lower competitive rent vector to coincide with the minimum competitive rent
vector.
Theorem 3.3.4.(1) (Kaneko et al., 2006). Let (p; x; y) be a maximum competitive equilib-
rium. If at least one of the following holds:
(i) IG(k) = IG(k)+1 for each k = 1; :::; f   1;
(ii) pk < Ck (yk + 1)  Ck (yk) for each k = 1; :::; f   1;
then the upper di¤erential rent vector (r1; :::; rf ) determined by rf = pf coincides with
(p1; :::; pf ).
(2) Let (p; x; y) be a minimum competitive equilibrium. If at least one of the following holds:
(i) IG(k) = IG(k)+1 for each k = 1; :::; f   1;
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(ii) pk > Ck (yk)  Ck (yk   1) for each k = 1; :::; f   1;
then the lower di¤erential rent vector (r1; :::; rf ) determined by rf = pf coincides with
(p1; :::; pf ).
The proof of (1) is found in Kaneko et al. (2006) and (2) is proved in the dual manner
(Appendix B). Condition (i) of each theorem is the same, stating that the boundary income
of the k-th category coincides with the income of the rst household in the k+1-th category.
Each (ii) has a dual structure: both state that a prot maximization condition strictly holds
for the k-th category (i.e., a competitive price pk does not coincide with a marginal cost for
the k-th category). In sum, (i) implies that when the number of households is large and the
income distribution is more or less dense (Condition (i) holds approximately), then the upper
and lower di¤erential rent vectors can be regarded as approximations of the maximum and
minimum competitive rent vectors, respectively.
3.3.2 The di¤erence between the upper and lower di¤erential rent vectors
In the previous section, we showed that the upper (lower) di¤erential rent vector is an upper
(lower) bound of a relevant part of the competitive rent set, and under a some condition, the
upper (lower) rent vector coincides with the maximum (minimum) competitive rent vector.
This section evaluates the di¤erence between the upper and lower di¤erential rent vectors.
By this, the di¤erence between the maximum and minimum competitive rent vectors is also
evaluated.
Here, we assume the case that pmink < p
max
k for all k = 1; :::; T . This and Theorem 3.1 by
Sai (2014) imply that for any competitive equilibria (p; x; y) and (p0; x0; y0),
yk = y
0
k for all k = 1; :::; T . (2.3)
By this assumption, a marginal category f and the boundary households G(k) (1  k  f)
are uniquely determined in the market (M;N).
The following theorem concerns the relationship between the income di¤erence and the
rent di¤erence. The proof is found in Section 3.3.3.
Theorem 3.3.5. Let (r1; :::; rf ) and (r1; :::; rf ) be the upper and lower di¤erential rent
vectors determined by u(e1; 0) < u(ef ; IG(f 1)   rf ), u(e1; 0) < u(ef ; IG(f 1)+1   rf ) and
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Figure 3.3: Shapes of rent di¤erences (three cases).
rf  rf , and k = 1; :::; f . Then,
rk   rk  IG(k 1)   IG(k 1)+1 if and only if rk   rk  rk 1   rk 1. (2.4)
Note that  of Eq. (2.4) can be replaced by , >, < or =.
The form of Theorem 3.3.5 is similar to the Basic comparative statics theorem of Kaneko
(1983) and Kaneko et al. (2006). Nevertheless, the meaning is di¤erent. Theorem 3.3.5
states that the rent di¤erence of the k-th category is smaller than the income di¤erence of
two neighboring households numbered G(k   1) and G(k   1) + 1 if and only if the rent
di¤erence of k   1 is greater than the rent di¤erence of k. This implies that we can reduce
the comparison of the di¤erences rk rk and rk 1 rk 1 to the comparison of the di¤erences
rk   rk and IG(k 1)   IG(k 1)+1.
Fig. 3.3 depicts three examples of a shape of rent di¤erences rk   rk. Fig.3.3.(1) explains
the case of the statement (2.4) holds for each k. In this case, the di¤erence rk   rk gradually
increases as k reaches 1. Fig.3.3.(2) explains the case where the opposite inequality of (2.4)
holds for each k. In this case, the di¤erence rk   rk gradually decreases as k reaches 1. The
remaining Fig.3.3.(3) explains the case where there is some category l = 1; :::; f such that an
inequality of (2.4) switches at l: the di¤erence rk   rk gradually increases for k = l; :::; f and
decreases for k = 1; :::; l   1. Numerical examples are given in Section 3.4.1.
The next theorem evaluates the rent di¤erence by the income di¤erence.
Theorem 3.3.6. Let (r1; :::; rf ) and (r1; :::; rf ) be the upper and lower di¤erential rent
vectors determined by u(e1; 0) < u(ef ; IG(f 1)   rf ), u(e1; 0) < u(ef ; IG(f 1)+1   rf ) and
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rf  rf . Suppose that rf   rf  IG(f 1)   IG(f 1)+1. Then,
0  rk   rk  max
klf 1
fIG(l)   IG(l)+1g for all k = 1; :::; f   1:
Theorem 3.3.6 states that if the rent di¤erence rf   rf of the marginal category f is less
than the income di¤erence IG(f 1)   IG(f 1)+1 of two neighboring households, then the rent
di¤erence of the k-th (k  f 1) category is bounded by at most the largest income di¤erence
IG(l)   IG(l)+1 (k  l  f   1).
In our study, the rent of the marginal category f is considered to be uniquely determined.5
Then, the upper and lower di¤erential rent vectors are determined by the same marginal rent
pf = rf = rf : thus, the supposition of Theorem 3.3.6 holds. Under this situation, the theorem
implies that the rent di¤erences rk   rk for each k are rather small. In particular, when we
target a considerably large housing market with a dense household income distribution (i.e.,
the equality IG(k) = IG(k)+1 approximately holds), the di¤erence can be approximated by
zero. Consequently, the comparative statics results are not very di¤erent, whether or not we
use the upper or lower di¤erential rent vectors.
Recall pmax (pmin) is the maximum (minimum) competitive rent vector in the market
(M;N). Theorem 3.3.6 and Theorem 3.3.3 imply the following assertion:
pmaxk   pmink  maxklf 1fIG(l)   IG(l)+1g for all k = 1; :::; f   1 (2.5)
if rf  pminf  pmaxf  rf ,
that is, the di¤erence of the maximum and minimum competitive rents of k-th category is
also bounded by the largest income di¤erence IG(l)  IG(l)+1 with k  l  f   1. This implies
the shrinkage result on the competitive rent vector set, which will be presented in Section
3.4.2.
3.3.3 Proofs of Theorems 3.3.5 and 3.3.6
Proof of Theorem 3.3.5. (Only if ) By Eq. (2.2), we have u(ek 1; IG(k 1)+1   rk 1) =
u(ek; IG(k 1)+1   rk): Let  = IG(k 1)   rk  (IG(k 1)+1   rk)  0. By Assumption D,
5For instance, Kaneko et al. (2006) adopted the estimated rent epf from the real rent data as the di¤erential
rent rf , and Ito (2007) adopted the (constant) marginal cost of the marginal category af as rf .
45
u(ek 1; IG(k 1)+1   rk 1 + )  u(ek; IG(k 1)+1   rk + ), that is,
u

ek 1; IG(k 1)   rk 1   rk + rk

 u(ek; IG(k 1)   rk)
= u(ek 1; IG(k 1)   rk 1) by Eq. (2:1):
This inequality together with Assumption A imply IG(k 1)  rk 1  rk+ rk  IG(k 1)  rk 1;
that is, rk   rk  rk 1   rk 1:
(If ) We prove the contraposition of the claim. Suppose that rk   rk > IG(k 1)   IG(k 1)+1.
By Eq. (2.1), we have u(ek 1; IG(k 1)   rk 1) = u(ek; IG(k 1)   rk): Let  = IG(k 1)+1   rk
 (IG(k 1)  rk)  0. By Assumption D, u(ek 1; IG(k 1)  rk 1+ ) > u(ek; IG(k 1)  rk+ ),
that is,
u(ek 1; IG(k 1)+1   rk 1   rk + rk) > u

ek; IG(k 1)+1   rk

= u(ek 1; IG(k 1)+1   rk 1) by Eq. (2:2):
This inequality together with Assumption A imply IG(k 1)+1  rk 1  rk + rk > IG(k 1)+1 
rk 1; that is, rk   rk > rk 1   rk 1:
Proof of Theorem 3.3.6. We proof this by mathematical induction over k = f   1; f   2
; :::; 1. Let k = f   1: By the hypothesis and Assumption A, we have u(ef ; IG(f 1)+1   pf )
 u(ef ; IG(f 1)   pf ): The left hand side is equal to u(ef 1; IG(f 1)+1   rf 1) by Eq. (2.2),
and the right hand side is equal to u(ef 1; IG(f 1)   rf 1) by Eq. (2.1). Hence, we have
u(ef 1; IG(f 1)+1   rf 1)  u(ef 1; IG(f 1)   rf 1): This and Assumption A imply
rf 1   rf 1  IG(f 1)   IG(f 1)+1: (2.6)
Let  = IG(f 1)   IG(f 1)+1  0. Since u(ef 1; IG(f 1)   rf 1) = u(ef ; IG(f 1)   rf ) by Eq.
(2.1), we have, by Assumption D, u(ef 1; IG(f 1)   rf 1   )  u(ef ; IG(f 1)   rf   ): This
inequality is restated as
u(ef 1; IG(f 1)+1   rf 1)  u

ef ; IG(f 1)+1   rf

 u

ef ; IG(f 1)+1   rf

= u(ef 1; IG(f 1)+1   rf 1) by Eq. (2:2):
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This and Assumption A imply IG(f 1)+1  rf 1  IG(f 1)+1  rf 1; that is, rf 1  rf 1: By
this and Eq. (2.6), we have the relation 0  rf 1   rf 1  IG(f 1)   IG(f 1)+1:
Suppose that for k = j with 1 < j  f   1;
0  rj   rj  maxjlf 1fIG(l)   IG(l)+1g: (2.7)
Then, for k = j   1;
(i) Suppose rj   rj  IG(j 1)   IG(j 1)+1. Then, u(ej ; IG(j 1)+1   rj)  u(ej ; IG(j 1)   rj):
The left hand side is equal to u(ej 1; IG(j 1)+1   rj 1) by Eq. (2.2), and the right hand
side is equal to u(ej 1; IG(j 1)   rj 1) by Eq. (2.1). Hence, u(ej 1; IG(j 1)+1   rj 1) 
u(ej 1; IG(j 1) rj 1): This and Assumption A imply IG(j 1)+1 rj 1  IG(j 1) rj 1, that
is,
rj 1   rj 1  IG(j 1)   IG(j 1)+1: (2.8)
Let  = IG(j 1)   IG(j 1)+1  0. Since u(ej 1; IG(j 1)   rj 1) = u(ej ; IG(j 1)   rj) by Eq.
(2.1), we have, by Assumption D, u(ej 1; IG(j 1)   rj 1   )  u(ej ; IG(j 1)   rj   ): This
inequality is restated as
u(ej 1; IG(j 1)+1   rj 1)  u(ej ; IG(j 1)+1   rj)
 u(ej ; IG(j 1)+1   rj) by Eq. (2.7)
= u(ej 1; IG(j 1)+1   rj 1) by Eq. (2.2).
This and Assumption A imply IG(j 1)+1   rj 1  IG(j 1)+1   rj 1, that is, rj 1  rj 1: By
this and Eq. (2.8), we get
0  rj 1   rj 1  IG(j 1)   IG(j 1)+1: (2.9)
(ii) Suppose rj rj > IG(j 1) IG(j 1)+1. Then, u(ej ; IG(j 1)+1 rj) > u(ej ; IG(j 1) rj): This
together with Eq. (2.1) and Eq. (2.2) we have u(ej 1; IG(j 1)+1   rj 1) > u(ej 1; IG(j 1)  
rj 1): This and Assumption A imply IG(j 1)+1   rj 1 > IG(j 1)   rj 1, that is,
rj 1   rj 1 > IG(j 1)   IG(j 1)+1: (2.10)
Let  = rj 1 rj 1 (IG(j 1) IG(j 1)+1)  0. Since u(ej 1; IG(j 1) rj 1) = u(ej ; IG(j 1) 
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rj) by Eq. (2.1), we have, by Assumption D, u(ej ; IG(j 1) rj+)  u(ej 1; IG(j 1) rj 1+):
This is restated as
u(ej ; IG(j 1)+1   rj + rj 1   rj 1)  (ej 1; IG(j 1)+1   rj 1)
= u(ej ; IG(j 1)+1   rj) by Eq. (2:2):
This and Assumption A imply IG(j 1)+1   rj + rj 1   rj 1 < IG(j 1)+1   rj , that is, rj 1  
rj 1 < rj   rj : By this and Eq. (2.10), we get IG(j 1)   IG(j 1)+1 < rj 1   rj 1 < rj   rj :
This together with Eq. (2.7) implies
0  IG(j 1)   IG(j 1)+1 < rj 1   rj 1  maxjlf 1fIG(l)   IG(l)+1g:
This inequality together with Eq. (2.9), we have
0  rj 1   rj 1  maxj 1kf 1fIG(k)   IG(k)+1g:
Hence, for all k = 1; :::; f   1, we have 0  rk   rk  maxklf 1fIG(l)   IG(l)+1g.
3.4 Examples and the application
3.4.1 Numerical examples
Here, we will show three examples. The settings for the rst and second examples are the
same except for the number of apartment units wk and households m. These examples show
the rent di¤erence in a large market is smaller than the rent di¤erence in a sparse market.
The third example is the case where the hypothesis of Theorem 3.3.6 fails.
Assume that there are six categories of apartments (T = 6). Let wk (k = 1; :::; 6) be the
number of apartment units for rent in the k-th category.6 We assume that the same number
of households come into the market, and that all the apartments are ultimately rented. That
is, the marginal category is f = 6 and the number of households m =
P6
k=1wk. Assume that
6Then, a cost function for landlord k can be expressed as Ck =

akyk if yk  wk
large if yk > wk
; where ak is a
constant and large is greater than I1.
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k 1 2 3 4 5 6
rk 225:7 162:5 100:1 70:3 43:4 20
rk 220:4 158:3 97:2 68:2 42:3 20
rk   rk 5:3 4:2 2:8 2:1 1:2 0
Table 3.1: Di¤erential rent vectors in Ex. 3.4.1
k 1 2 3 4 5 6
rk 223:4 161 99:4 69:9 43:3 20
rk 222:1 160 98:7 69:4 43 20
rk   rk 1:3 1:0 0:7 0:5 0:3 0
Table 3.2: Di¤erential rent vectors in Ex. 3.4.2
each household has the following utility function:
u(ek; c) = hk +
p
c for k = 0; 1; :::; 6;
where h1 = 9; h2 = 7; h3 = 5; h4 = 4; h5 = 3; h6 = 2 and h0 = 0. This utility function
satises Assumption A, C,D, E and F. Also, we assume the income of each household is
uniformly distributed over the interval [100; 500].
Example 3.4.1. Let wk = 5 for each k = 1; :::; 6. Then, m = 5  6 = 30 and we have
IG(k)   IG(k)+1 ' 13:8 for each k. Let r6 = r6 = 20. Under these settings, we can calculate
the upper and lower di¤erential rent vectors by the rent Eqs. (2.1) and (2.2). Table 3.1 shows
the calculation results of rk, rk and the di¤erence rk   rk.
By Table 3.1, an inequality rk rk  maxkjf 1fIG(j) IG(j)+1g of Theorem 3.3.6 holds
for each k. We also observe rk rk < rk 1 rk 1 for each k. This is consistent with Theorem
3.3.5 because rk   rk < IG(k 1)   IG(k 1)+1 for each k (which corresponds to Fig. 3.3.(1) in
Section 3.3.2). To sum up, the di¤erence rk   rk is smaller than IG(k)   IG(k)+1 for each k;
however, the di¤erence tends to larger as a category gets better.
Example 3.4.2. Let wk = 20 for each k = 1; :::; 6. Then, m = 20  6 = 120 and we have
IG(k)   IG(k)+1 ' 3:4 for each k. Let r6 = r6 = 20. Table 3.2 shows the calculation results of
rk, rk and rk   rk.
As with Example 3.4.1, the di¤erence rk   rk is smaller than IG(k)   IG(k)+1 for each k;
however, it tends to larger as a category gets better. Compared to Table 3.1, the di¤erence
rk   rk is signicantly smaller for each k.
We next give another example where the hypothesis of Theorem 3.3.6 fails. This example
shows that whereas the rent di¤erence rk   rk exceeds the income di¤erence IG(k)   IG(k)+1,
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k 1 2 3 4 5 6
rk 223:4 161 99:4 69:9 43:3 20
rk 219 156:5 94:7 65:1 38:4 15
rk   rk 4:4 4:5 4:7 4:8 4:9 5
Table 3.3: Di¤erential rent vectors in Ex. 3.4.3
the rent di¤erence tends to decrease as k goes to 1.
Example 3.4.3. Let wk = 20 for each k (IG(k)   IG(k)+1 ' 3:4). Let r6 = 20 and r6 = 15.
Then, we have r6   r6 = 5 > 3:4 ' IG(5)   IG(5)+1; that is, the hypothesis of Theorem 3.3.6
fails. Table 3.3 shows the calculation results of rk, rk and, rk   rk.
From Table 3.3, we have rk   rk > maxkjf 1fIG(j)   IG(j)+1g for each k (Theorem
3.3.6 fails). On the other hand, the di¤erence rk   rk tends to decrease as k reaches 1. This
is consistent with Theorem 3.3.5 because rk   rk > IG(k 1)   IG(k 1)+1 for each k (which
corresponds to Fig. 3.3.(2) in Section 3.3.2). Note that this example does not explain the
necessity of the condition rf  rf  IG(f 1) IG(f 1)+1 for Theorem 3.3.6. It may be possible
that Theorem 3.3.6 holds but rf   rf > IG(f 1)   IG(f 1)+1.
3.4.2 Shrinkage of di¤erential/competitive rent vectors with many house-
holds
As a consequence of our results in Section 3.3, we show a shrinkage result on a di¤erential (or
competitive) rent vector. In Chapter 2, Section 2.5.2, we showed the set of competitive price
vectors shrinks to a unique point as the number of sellers become large. According to our
Theorem 3.3.3 and 3.3.6, we will also obtain a similar result for markets with large number
of households.
Let f(M ; N)g1=0 be a sequence of rental housing markets. We assume for each , a
market (M ; N) satises Assumptions A-G. We consider the situation where for a large ,
the market has many households and their income distribution gets dense. This is formalized
by the following condition.
Condition 3.4.4. There is some constant  > 0 such that for any , f(M ; N)g1=0 satises
(1) jM j ! 1 as  !1;
(2) Ii   for all i 2M ;
(3) maxi2Mnf1g[Ii 1   Ii ]  = jM j.
Condition 3.4.4.(1) and (2) imply that, although the number of households becomes large,
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the income of each household is bounded; while (1) and (3) imply that an interval of two
adjacent incomes tends to be small as the number of households becomes large. In sum,
Condition 3.4.4 means that the income distribution of (M ; N) becomes denser as  gets
larger.
For the market (M ; N) (  0), let pmax  (pmin ) be the maximum (minimum) com-
petitive rent vector, f be a marginal category and (r1 ; :::; r

f ), (r

1 ; :::; r

f ) be the upper and
lower di¤erential rent vectors determined by rf = p
max 
f and r

f = p
min 
f . Then, we have
the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4.5. Suppose that f(M ; N)g1=0 satises Condition 3.4.4 and for each   1,
0  rf   rf  IG(f 1)   IG(f 1)+1. Then,
Pf
k=1 rk   rk ! 0 as  !1.
Proof. By Theorem 3.3.6, we have 0 Pf 1k=1 rk rk Pf 1k=1 maxklf 1[IG(l) IG(l)+1]:
The right hand side of the inequality is not greater than = jM j by Condition 3.4.3, which
tends to zero as  !1.
Theorem 3.4.5 together with Eq. (2.5) in Section 3.3.2 imply that a competitive rent
vector (p1 ; :::; p

f ) of a relevant part also shrinks to a unique point:
Pf
k=1 p
max 
k   pmin k ! 0
as  !1.7
3.5 Conclusions
We have evaluated the di¤erence between the upper and lower di¤erential rent vectors in a
rental housing market model by Kaneko et al. (2006), where the identical utility function
and the normality of the quality of housing are assumed. The upper (lower) di¤erential rent
vector is the solution of system of equations. In general, the upper (lower) di¤erential rent
vector is an upper (lower) bound of the set of competitive rent vectors. It coincides with the
maximum (minimum) competitive rent vectors under some condition.
Our main result (Theorem 3.3.6) is that the rent di¤erence of k-th category is smaller
than the largest income di¤erence between specic neighboring households numbered G(l)
and G(l)+1 (k  l  f 1). This implies that the rent di¤erence can be regarded as small and
consequently, the di¤erence between the maximum and minimum competitive rent vectors is
also small. Furthermore, the di¤erence shrinks to zero as the market becomes larger and the
7 Indeed, the remaining categories f +1; :::; T are inessential in our market model since no units in the k-th
category (f < k  T ) are traded (nevertheless, a competitive rent pk (k > f) is determined with pk  Ck(1)).
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household income distribution becomes denser (Theorem 3.4.5). Another result (Theorem
3.3.5) indicates that we can reduce the comparison of two rent di¤erences of the k-th and
k   1-th categories into a comparison of the rent di¤erences of the k-th category and the
income di¤erences of neighboring households numbered G(k   1) and G(k   1) + 1. Our
results argue that a di¤erential rent vector is a good approximation for a competitive rent
vector; and furthermore, when we study a considerably large market, comparative statics
results are similar whether we use an upper or lower di¤erential rent vectors.
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Chapter 4
Comparative Statics in Housing
Markets with Indivisibilities: How
Rising Income Inequality A¤ects on
Housing Rents?
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present the impact of rising household income inequality on housing rents.
The market model that we adopt is the rental housing market model by Kaneko, Ito and
Osawa (2006), which is an application of the assignment model (Shapley and Shubik, 1972;
Kaneko, 1982) where the agents are divided into buyers and sellers, each buyer (household)
demands at most one apartment unit, and each seller (landlord) provides some apartment
units. The apartments as indivisible commodities are classied into nite categories 1; :::; T
based on their qualities. The goods other than apartments are aggregated and consumed as
composite good (money). A household utility function is assumed to be homogeneous, and
allows income e¤ect on housing qualities.
It is known that this market model guarantees the existence of a competitive equilibrium
(Kaneko, 1982; Kaneko and Yamamoto, 1986). Furthermore, a competitive rent vector can be
calculated by a solution for a certain system of equations (the solution is called the di¤erential
rent vector). In our analysis, we directly consider the di¤erential rent vector rather than the
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competitive rent vector.
Here, we briey introduce our comparative statics results. The rst result is that the
impact of an increase in income inequality can be divided by three cases: (1) rise in com-
petitive rent at every category, (2) rise at higher categories and decline at lower categories
or (3) decline at every category. The second result characterized (1)-(3) by the location of
household who divides the households into the income-increased group and the decreased
group. From this characterization, we show (1) is an extreme case, while (2) and also (3) of
a counterintuitive results are possible.
We also show some tendency found between the rent change and diminishing rate of
marginal utility by numerical example: the rent change tends to show (3) as a diminishing
rate of marginal utility for housing gets larger ; the rent change tends to show the case (2)
a diminishing rate of marginal utility for composite goods gets larger. These observations
implies that there is a certain low between marginal rate of substitution and a rent change.
Here, we introduce related literature. Kaneko et al. (2006) studied e¤ects of changes in
incomes of boundary households on a competitive rent vector. The boundary household is
dened for each category of apartments. This household plays a crucial role in the model.
The authors showed that when the boundary income di¤erence is larger (smaller) for a better
category of apartments, the rent di¤erence forms convex (concave) shape.
Ito (2007) presented the e¤ects of a rise in only the boundary household income of category
k on competitive rents, under a more restricted assumption on a utility function. The author
showed that rents are unchanged at k + 1; :::; T , increase at 1; :::; k and a rent di¤erence of
each category 1; :::; k   2 is smaller for a better category of apartments.
Määttänen and Terviö (2014) studied the e¤ect of rising income inequality on house
prices in the one-sided assignment model. One-sided means that the agents are potentially
seller and buyer. The authors assume a continuum of agents and housing types (thus, an
analytical method is calculus), and the homogeneity and normality on the utility functions.
The authors presented a similar result to our main result. Braid (1981) also studied the
e¤ects of parameter changes on rent distributions under the two-sided version of Määttänen
and Terviös framework.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 formulates the market model and explains
some notions for the study. Section 4.3 examines the impact of rising income inequality on
a competitive rent distribution. Section 4.4 gives additional studies on the relation between
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an income distribution and a rent distribution by numerical examples. Section 4.5 presents
conclusions and some remarks.
4.2 The market model
The rental housing market model (Kaneko et al., 2006) is denoted by (M;N), where the
symbol M = f1; : : : ;mg denotes the set of households, and N = f1; : : : ; Tg denotes the set of
landlords. The objects of trade are apartments (indivisible) and money (perfectly divisible).
The apartments are classied into a nite number of T categories by their housing attributes
(e.g., housing size and commuting time). Each landlord k 2 N supplies of apartment units
of the k-th category (thus k is the only landlord providing the k-th apartments).1
Each household i 2 M initially has an income Ii > 0 but no dwelling. The household
wants to live in some apartment and use income to pay rent. Without loss of generality, we
can assume that the households are ordered in their incomes as I1  I2      Im. The
consumption set is written by X := fe0; e1; : : : ; eT gR+; where ek is the T -dimensional unit
vector with k-th component is 1 (e0 = 0), and R+ is the set of nonnegative real numbers.
A consumption bundle (ek; c) 2 X with k 6= 0 means that household i rents one apartment
unit of category k and enjoys the consumption c = Ii   pk paying rent pk of category k. For
k = 0, no apartment is consumed. An initial endowment of i 2 M is given as (e0; Ii) with
Ii > 0. Each household has an identical utility function u : X ! R satisfying the following
assumption:
Assumption A. For each x 2 fe0; e1; : : : ; eT g; u(x; c) is a continuous and strictly monotone
function of c, and u(e0; Ii) > u(ek; 0) for all k = 1; :::; T:
The identical utility function implies that a housing market (M;N) represents a mono-
centric city, and every household commutes to the same business district. In Assumption A,
continuity and monotonicity of money are standard; the latter inequality means the indis-
pensability of money. We also assume the following B-D on u(; ).
Assumption B. If u(xi; c) = u(x0i; c
0); and c < c0; then u(xi; c + ) > u(x0i; c
0 + ) for any
 > 0:
1The original model of Kaneko et al (2006) assume that jN j  T and there are more than one seller
providing apartments of type k (= 1; :::; T ). As far as competitive equilibrium is concerned, we can assume
without of generality that only one seller provides apartments of type k(= 1; :::; T ) (thus the set N becomes
N = f1; :::; Tg). See Section 5 of Sai (2014).
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Assumption C. If u(xi; c) > u(x0i; c
0); then u(xi; c) = u(x0i; c
0 + ) for some  > 0:
Assumption D. u(e1; 0) > u(e2; 0) >    > u(eT ; 0):
Assumption B is the normality assumption on the quality of apartments in the following
sense. In B, the k-th apartment has a better quality than k0, since living in k with smaller
consumption c is indi¤erent to living in k0 with larger c0. When an income is increased
by the same magnitude  > 0, the household strictly demands a better apartment. The
normality implies that even if we assume an identical utility function, households having
di¤erent incomes demand di¤erent qualities of apartments. Assumption C means that the
housing quality of an apartment is substitutable for money. Assumption D means that the
apartment qualities are strictly ordered numerically.2
We next dene the seller side. Each landlord k 2 N = f1; :::; Tg provides apartments of
k-th category. The landlord has a cost function Ck(yk) : Z+ ! R+; where Z+ is the set of
nonnegative integers. For each yk 2 Z+, Ck(yk) represents the cost (in terms of money) of
supplying yk units of apartments of k-th category. In this study, we employ the following
simple form of Ck().
Assumption E. For each k 2 N; Ck(yk) is expressed as
Ck(yk) =
8><>: akyk if yk  wk,largeif yk  wk + 1;
In Assumption E, the constant ak > 0 is the marginal cost of providing an additional
unit, and largeis a su¢ ciently large number. The remaining constant wk is the number of
all apartment units owned by landlord k. This cost function means that landlord k supplies
units up to wk with the constant marginal cost ak, while never supplying more than wk units,
since the cost to build a new one is very large relative to market size.
We dene a competitive equilibrium in (M;N). Let p 2 RT+ be the price vector, x 2
fe0; e1; : : : ; eT gm be the demand vector and y 2 ZT+ be the supply vector. A triple (p; x; y)
is a competitive equilibrium i¤
(UM): for all i 2M; (i) Ii   pxi  0, where pxi =
PT
k=1 pkxik;
(ii) u(xi; Ii   pxi)  u(x0i; Ii   px0i) for all x0i 2 fe0; e1; : : : ; eT g with Ii   pxi  0.
2Assumption D together with Assumptions A, B and C imply that u(e1; c) > u(e2; c) >    > u(eT ; c) for
all c 2 R+.
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(PM): for all k 2 N; pkyk   Ck(yk)  pky0k   Ck(y0k) for all y0k 2 Z+:
(BDS):
P
i2M xi =
PT
k=1 yke
k.
There exists a competitive equilibrium (p; x; y) in (M;N) (Kaneko and Yamamoto, 1986),
the maximum and minimum competitive rent vectors (Kaneko et al., 2006; Sai, 2015).3,4 In
our analysis, we focus on the maximum competitive rent vector. This rent vector is calculated
by the solution of a certain system of equations called the rent equation.5 The following
proposition is necessary to dene the rent equation.
Proposition 4.2.1 (Kaneko et al., 2006). Let (p; x; y) be a competitive equilibrium. Then,
(1) If k < k0 and xi = ek
0
for some i, then pk > pk0 :
(2) If xi = ek; xj = ek
0
and Ii > Ij for some i; j, then k  k0:
This states that in any competitive equilibrium, (1) the price of a better apartment is
higher than that of a worse one, and (2) a household with a higher income rents a better
apartment. Note that Proposition 4.2.1. (1) does not exclude the case of yk = 0. The
following assumption eliminates such a case.
Assumption F. Let (p; x; y) be a competitive equilibrium. There exists some category f
such that yk > 0 for k = 1; :::; f and yk = 0 for k = f + 1; :::; T .
We call this f the marginal category. By Proposition 4.2.1. (1) and Assumption F, we
have p1 > p2 >    > pf .
Recall that the households 1; :::;m are ordered by their incomes as I1  I2      Im.
We dene the household with the lowest income in each active category. Let (p; x; y) be a
maximum competitive equilibrium. For each category k  f , we dene the household G(k)
with the lowest income in the k-th category as
G(k) :=
kP
t=1
yt:
For each k, we call G(k) the boundary household of the k-th category.
The rent equation (Kaneko et al., 2006) is dened as the system of equations with un-
3A vector p 2 RT+ is a competitive price vector i¤ (p; x; y) is a competitive equilibrium, and p is the maximum
(minimum) competitive price vector i¤ p  p0 (p  p0) for any competitive price vector p0.
4 Indeed, these existence theorems are guaranteed only under Assumptions A and E.
5 Instead of the maximum one, we may focus on the minimum competitive rent vector. It follows from Sai
(2014) and/or Sai (2015) that the di¤erence between pmax and pmin is rather small when a market is thick
with landlords and/or households.
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knowns r1; :::; rf :
u(ef 1; IG(f 1)   rf 1) = u(ef ; IG(f 1)   rf );
u(ef 2; IG(f 2)   rf 2) = u(ef 1; IG(f 2)   rf 1);
...
u(e1; IG(1)   r1) = u(e2; IG(1)   r2):
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
(3.1)
Note that the rent equation (3.1) has f unknowns constituted as f   1 equations. Eq. (3.1)
states that a household G(k) is indi¤erent between renting the k+1-th apartment at rent rk+1
and renting the k-th category at rk. In Eq. (3.1), if the rent of marginal category rf is given,
the rst equation of Eq. (3.1) determines rf 1. In the same manner, the remaining rents
rf 2; :::; r1 are recursively determined. We call a solution (r1; :::; rf ) of Eq. (3.1) a di¤erential
rent vector. Under our assumptions, if rf is given with u(e1; 0) < u(ef ; IG(f 1)   rf ), then a
di¤erential rent vector is uniquely determined and satises r1 >    > rf 1 > rf .
We conclude this section by noting the relation between a di¤erential rent vector and a
competitive rent vector. Let p = (p1; :::; pT ) be the maximum competitive rent vector and
(r1; :::; rf ) is a di¤erential rent vector given by rf  pf . Then, it holds that rk  pk for all
k = 1; :::; f (Theorem 3.1 by Sai, 2015). In particular, if rf = pf and some condition holds,
then rk = pk for all k = 1; :::; f .6 Hereafter, we use a di¤erential rent vector for comparative
statics.
4.3 The impact of rising income inequalities on competitive
rents
4.3.1 Comparative statics
In this section, we study the relation between household income distributions and competitive
equilibria. The main purpose is to explain how rising income inequality a¤ects a competitive
rent vector. Recall that the set of households M = f1; :::;mg is ordered by their income
levels as I1      Im. Here we consider a new market where only the structure of household
incomes change. To be precise, fI1;    ; Img changes to fbI1;    ; bImg, but the remainingM;N;
6These are two conditions by Kaneko et al. (2006), Theorem 2.6: (1) IG(k) = IG(k)+1 for each k =
1; :::; f   1; (2) pk < Ck (yk + 1)  Ck (yk) for each k = 1; :::; f   1.
Even when neither condition holds, a di¤erential rent vector can be an approximation of the maximum
competitive rent vector. See Sai (2015), Section 3.1.
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u(; ); ck(), f and rf are unchanged.7 By assumption E, the supply amount is also unchanged
for each category 1; :::; f , and consequently, the boundary household G(k) =
Pk
t=1wt (k =
1; :::; f) remains the same. We consider the following condition on household incomes.
Condition InE (Increase in Income Inequality). There exists a household i < m such that
Ii < bIi for i 2 f1;    ; ig and Ii > bIi for i 2 fi + 1;    ;mg, and Pi2M (Ii   bIi) = 0:
This condition states that in the new market, income increases for the upper households
greater than i + 1 and declines for the lower households less than i, preserving the level of
gross income.
Let (r1;    ; rf 1; rf ) and (br1;    ; brf 1; rf ) be di¤erential rent vectors in the original and
new markets determined by rf with u(e1; 0) < u(ef ; bIG(f 1)   rf ). In the next theorem, we
examine how the new rent vector (br1;    ; brf 1) changes under Condition InE (the proof will
be given in Section 4.3.2).
Theorem 4.3.1 (The Possible Cases of Rent Change). Under Condition InE, either (1), (2)
or (3) holds:
(1) rk < brk for k = 1; :::; f   1:
(2) There exist a category k( f   2) such that
8>>>><>>>>:
rk < brk for k = 1; :::; k   1;
rk  brk ;
rk > brk for k = k + 1; :::; f   1:
(3) rk > brk for k = 1; :::; f   1.
This theorem shows three possibilities of rent change when income inequality increases.
Theorems 4.3.1. (1) and (3) are straightforward: (1) [(3), respectively] states that rent rises
(falls) for every category 1; :::; f   1 in the new market, and (2) states that rents rise for
upper categories 1; :::; k and fall for lower categories k + 1; :::; f   1. The illustration of (2)
is depicted in Fig. 4.1.
One may think Theorems 4.3.1. (1) and (3) are counterintuitive. It is natural that rising
income inequality causes a decline in rent for lower categories and a rise in rent for upper
categories [case (2)]. Indeed, in the next theorem we show that (1) is an extreme case; on
the other hand, we also show that (3) is a common result.
Theorem 4.3.2 (Location of Household i and Rent Change). Under Condition InE, the
following holds:
7We also assume that fbI1;    ; bImg satises bI1      bIm
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Figure 4.1: An illustration of Theorem 4.3.1. (2).
(1) G(f   1)  i implies Theorem 4.3.1.(1).
(2) G(1)  i < G(f   1) implies Theorem 4.3.1.(2) or (3).
(3) i < G(1) implies Theorem 4.3.1. (3).
This theorem characterizes three cases of Theorem 4.3.1 by the location of household i of
Condition InE. The rst inequality G(f   1)  i means that the boundary income of every
category rises, i.e., IG(k) < bIG(k) for every k = 1; :::; f   1. Similarly, the third inequality
G(f   1)  i means that IG(k) > bIG(k) for every k = 1; :::; f   1. Both are extreme cases in
that the number of income declined (increased) households is extremely small compared
with the number of increased (declined) households: in the former case, every income
declined household is assigned to the marginal category f , and the income declined segment
fbIi+1; :::; bImg is irrelevant to the determination of rents br1; :::; brf 1, and in the latter case,
every income increased household is assigned to the 1-st category.
Theorem 4.3.2 implies that when we exclude the two extreme cases above, two possibilities
remain, Theorem 4.3.1. (2) or (3), as the result of a rent change (i.e., a counterintuitive result
still occurs). Then what factors determine the establishment of either Theorem 4.3.1. (2) or
(3)? We discuss this in the next section.
Notice that we assumed that the apartment stock is xed (Assumption E). In this sense,
our study is a short-run equilibrium analysis. One possible example of such a short-term
change in household income distribution is that of a governments change in its policy of
redistribution. In our result, Theorems 3.1 and 2 imply that strengthening of income redis-
tribution causes either a rise in rent for every category of housing, or a decrease in rent for
a few upper categories and a rise in rent for other categories (that is, the supplier share of
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excess economic rent increases).
We conclude this section by comparing our results with other related studies. Kaneko et
al. (2006) studied e¤ects of changes in boundary incomes on a di¤erential rent vector. In
particular, they considered the case bIG(f 1) IG(f 1)  bIG(f 2) IG(f 2)      bIG(1) IG(1),
i.e., the boundary income increment is larger for a better category of apartments.8 ;9 Then,
according to their Theorem 5.2. (1) and Corollary 6.2. (1) (Kaneko et al., p.160 and p.162),
the rent di¤erences form a convex shape.10
Määttänen and Terviö (2014) also studied the e¤ect of rising income inequality on housing
prices by using the one-sided continuum assignment model. In their model, each agent initially
has a house and money, and they exchange them. They assumed that a continuum of agents
and housing types, and the homogeneity and normality of utility functions. Their main result
(Proposition 4, p.391) is essentially the same as our Theorem 4.3.1 with the exclusion of the
case (1).11 Nevertheless, their analytical method is di¤erent from ours because they use
calculus for analyses, whereas our model is based on niteness.
4.3.2 Proofs of Theorem 4.3.1 and Theorem 4.3.2
It su¢ ces to prove Theorem 4.3.2.
Proof of Theorem 4.3.2.(1). Suppose G(f   1)  i, i.e., IG(k) < bIG(k) for every k =
1; :::; f   1. We prove this by mathematical induction over f   1; :::; 1. Let  = bIG(f 1)  
IG(f 1) > 0. the rent equation (3.1) and the normality assumption (Assumption B) imply
u(ef 1; IG(f 1)   rf 1 + ) > u(ef ; IG(f 1)   rf + );
8They also considered the opposite case: bIG(f 1)   IG(f 1)  bIG(f 2)   IG(f 2)      bIG(1)   IG(1).
9Our Condition InE can be applied to their condition asbIG(f 1)   IG(f 1)      bIG(k)   IG(k) < 0 < bIG(k 1)   IG(k 1)      bIG(1)   IG(1)
for some k 2 f2; :::; f   1g:
This is understood as the income inequality signicantly increases.
10To be precise, the rent di¤erence holds
0 > brf 1   rf 1 >    > brk1   rk1 =    = brk2   rk2 <    < br1   r1;
where k  k2  k1  f   1,
that is, the decrement of brk to rk gets larger for category f   1; f   2;    ; k1, becoming maximal for k1;    ;
k2 and smaller for k2; :::; 1:
11Their condition of an increase in income equality excludes antecedents of Theorem 4.3.2. (1) and (3).
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that is,
u(ef 1; bIG(f 1)   rf 1) > u(ef ; bIG(f 1)   rf )
= u(ef 1; bIG(f 1)   brf 1) by Eq. (3.1).
This inequality and the monotonicity (Assumption A) imply bIG(f 1) rf 1 > bIG(f 1) brf 1,
that is, rf 1 < brf 1.
Suppose rk < brk for k with 1 < k  f 1. Then we show this relation also holds for k 1.
Let  = bIG(k 1)   brk   (IG(k 1)   rk) and suppose  > 0. Then, Eq. (3.1) and Assumption B
imply
u(ek 1; IG(k 1)   rk 1 + ) > u(ek; IG(k 1)   rk + );
that is,
u(ek 1; bIG(k 1)   rk 1   brk + rk) > u(ek; bIG(k 1)   brk)
= u(ek 1; bIG(k 1)   brk 1) by Eq. (3.1).
This inequality and Assumption A imply bIG(k 1)   rk 1   brk + rk > bIG(k 1)   brk 1, that is,brk 1   rk 1 > brk   rk > 0.
Suppose the other case   0. Then, Assumption A imply u(ek; IG(k 1) rk)  u(ek; bIG(k 1) brk). Since the left hand side equals u(ek 1; IG(k 1)   rk 1) and the right hand side equals
u(ek 1; bIG(k 1) brk 1) by Eq. (3.1), we have u(ek 1; IG(k 1) rk 1)  u(ek 1; bIG(k 1) brk 1).
Again, by Assumption A, we have IG(k 1)   rk 1  bIG(k 1)   brk 1, that is, brk 1   rk 1 bIG(k 1)   IG(k 1) > 0. Hence we obtain rk 1 < brk 1:
Proof of (2). Suppose G(1)  i < G(f   1) and let k = min[k : i < G(k)]. We rst
prove the inequality rk > brk holds for k = k; :::; f   1 by mathematical induction. Let
 = IG(f 1)   bIG(f 1) > 0. The rent equation (3.1) and Assumption B imply
u(ef 1; bIG(f 1)   brf 1 + ) > u(ef ; bIG(f 1)   rf + );
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that is,
u(ef 1; IG(f 1)   brf 1) > u(ef ; IG(f 1)   rf )
= u(ef 1; IG(f 1)   rf 1) by Eq. (3.1).
This inequality and Assumption A imply IG(f 1) brf 1 > IG(f 1) rf 1, that is, rf 1 > brf 1.
Suppose the inequality rk > brk holds for k with k < k  f   1. We show this also holds
for k 1. Let  = IG(k 1)  rk  (bIG(k 1) brk) and suppose  > 0. Eq. (3.1) and Assumption
B imply
u(ek 1; bIG(k 1)   brk 1 + ) > u(ek; bIG(k 1)   brk + );
that is,
u(ek 1; IG(k 1)   brk 1   rk + brk) > u(ek; IG(k 1)   rk)
= u(ek 1; IG(k 1)   rk 1) by Eqs. (3.1).
This inequality and Assumption A imply IG(k 1)   brk 1   rk + brk > IG(k 1)   rk 1, that is,
rk 1   brk 1 > rk   brk > 0. Hence we obtain rk 1 > brk 1:
Suppose the other case   0. Then, Assumption A imply u(ek; bIG(k 1) brk)  u(ek; IG(k 1) 
rk). Since the left hand side equals u(ek 1; bIG(k 1)   brk 1) and the right hand side equals
u(ek 1; IG(k 1) rk 1) by Eq. (3.1), we have u(ek 1; bIG(k 1) brk 1)  u(ek 1; IG(k 1) rk 1).
Again, by Assumption A, we have bIG(k 1)   brk 1  IG(k 1)   rk 1, that is, rk 1   brk 1 
IG(k 1)   bIG(k 1) > 0. Hence we obtain rk 1 > brk 1:
From the above discussion, we have rk > brk holds for k = k; :::; f   1. We next show
either rk > brk or rk  brk holds for k = 1; :::; k   1. Furthermore, we show that once rk  brk
appears for some k  k   1, then it holds that rk < brk for k = 1; :::; k   1:
Let  = bIG(k 1)   brk   (IG(k 1)   rk). By condition InE, we have
bIG(k 1)   brk   (IG(k 1)   rk) > 0: (3.2)
Eq. (3.1) and Assumption B imply
u(ek
 1; IG(k 1)   rk 1 + ) > u(ek

; IG(k 1)   rk + );
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that is,
u(ek
 1; bIG(k 1)   rk 1   brk + rk) > u(ek ; bIG(k 1)   brk)
= u(ek
 1; bIG(k 1)   brk 1) by Eq. (3.1).
This inequality and Assumption A imply bIG(k 1)  rk 1 brk+ rk > bIG(k 1) brk 1, that
is,
rk   brk > rk 1   brk 1: (3.3)
On the other hand, Eq. (3.2) and Assumption A imply u(ek

; bIG(k 1)   brk) > u(ek ;
IG(k 1)  rk). Since the left hand side equals u(ek 1; bIG(k 1)   brk 1) and the right hand
side equals u(ek
 1; IG(k 1)   rk 1) by Eq. (3.1), we have u(ek 1; bIG(k 1)   brk 1) >
u(ek
 1; IG(k 1)   rk 1). Again, by assumption A, we have bIG(k 1)   brk 1 > IG(k 1)  
rk 1, that is, rk 1   brk 1 > IG(k 1)   bIG(k 1). By this and Eq. (3.3), we have
rk   brk > rk 1   brk 1 > IG(k 1)   bIG(k 1).
Since rk > brk and IG(k 1) < bIG(k 1), there are two cases: rk 1 > brk 1 or rk 1  brk 1.
If the latter case, the category k of Theorem 4.3.1.(2) is k = k   1.
Let k with 1 < k  k   1.
(Case rk > brk): By Condition InE, bIG(k 1) > IG(k 1). Thus, we have bIG(k 1) brk (IG(k 1) 
rk) > 0. In the same manner with the above discussion, we have
rk   brk > rk 1   brk 1 > IG(k 1)   bIG(k 1);
and there may be two cases rk 1 > brk 1 or rk 1  brk 1. If the latter case, the category k
of Theorem 4.3.1.(2) is k = k   1.
(Case rk  brk): Suppose that  = bIG(k 1) brk (IG(k 1) rk) > 0. Eq. (3.1) and Assumption
B imply
u(ek 1; IG(k 1)   rk 1 + ) > u(ek; IG(k 1)   rk + );
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that is,
u(ek 1; bIG(k 1)   rk 1   brk + rk) > u(ek; bIG(k 1)   brk)
= u(ek 1; bIG(k 1)   brk 1) by Eq. (3.1).
This inequality and Assumption A imply bIG(k 1)   rk 1   brk + rk > bIG(k 1)   brk 1, that is,
rk 1 < brk 1.
Suppose the other case bIG(k 1) brk (IG(k 1) rk)  0. This inequality and Assumption A
imply u(ek; bIG(k 1) brk)  u(ek; IG(k 1) rk). Since the left hand side equals u(ek 1; bIG(k 1) brk 1) and the right hand side equals u(ek 1; IG(k 1) rk 1) we have u(ek 1; bIG(k 1) brk 1) 
u(ek 1; IG(k 1)   rk 1). Again, by Assumption A, bIG(k 1)   brk 1  IG(k 1)   rk 1. SincebIG(k 1) > IG(k 1), we obtain rk 1 < brk 1.
Proof of (3). The proof is the same as the early part of the proof of (2).
4.4 Numerical examples
In the previous section, we gave Theorems 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 for the relation between the dis-
tribution of income and housing rents. Theorem 4.3.1 stated that an increase in income
inequality causes either (1) a rise in rent for every category, (2) a rise for higher categories
and a fall for lower categories, or (3) a fall for every category [also we showed (1) is a special
case]. Here, we provide additional observations using two numerical examples.
The rst example shows that there is a certain tendency with rent changes depending on
the diminishing rate of marginal utility. To be precise, the rent change tends to show case
(3) of Theorem 4.3.1 as the diminishing rate of marginal utility for housing gets larger ; and
the rent change tends to show case (2) of Theorem 4.3.1 as the diminishing rate of marginal
utility for composite goods gets larger. These observations imply that if the diminishing rate
of marginal rate of substitution of housing for composite good is large (that is, the degree of
convexity of the indi¤erence curve is large), then the rent change tends to show case (3) of
Theorem 4.3.1.
The second example conrms our Theorem 4.3.2. (2). It shows that an increase in income
inequality possibly causes case (2) or (3) of Theorem 4.3.1, under the condition that the other
parameters remain the same.
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Figure 4.2: Rent distributions when income distribution changes (1).
4.4.1 Diminishing rate of marginal utility and rent change
Suppose that there are T = 40 categories of apartments (also suppose f = T ), an apartment
of each category is possibly supplied at most one unit (wk = 1 for all k = 1; :::; 40) and the
number of households m = 40. Then G(k) =
Pk
t=1 1 for k = 1; :::; 40. Each household has
the following separable utility function:
u(ek; c) = hk + 5c
a (k = 0; :::; 40 and 0 < a < 1):
Let h0 = 0; h40 = 1 and hk = hk   hk+1 (h40 = h40   h0). We consider the following
di¤erent diminishing rates for hk.
(1) Diminishing rates of marginal utility for hk:
(i) hk 1 = hk (0% diminishing rate);
(ii) hk 1 = 0:99hk (1% diminishing rate);
(iii) hk 1 = 0:97hk (3% diminishing rate):
A parameter a of u() is xed as a = 0:5. We assume that the distribution of household
(monthly) income is uniform and its interval changes from [300; 500] to [100; 700]. Let the mar-
ginal rent r40 = 50. We then calculate di¤erential rent vectors (r1; :::; r40) and (br1; :::; br39; r40).
The rent distributions are shown in Fig. 4.2.
In Fig. 4.2, black lines depict di¤erential rents before the income change, and gray
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lines depict rents after the income change; solid lines correspond to (1)-(i), ne dotted lines
correspond to (1)-(ii), and coarse dotted lines correspond to (1)-(iii). As shown in Fig. 4.2,
the decrement of rent when inequality increases gets larger as the diminishing rate for hk
increases.
The reason for this tendency could be explained as follows. Let k be a category of apart-
ment. When the marginal utility of dwellings diminishes, for each household the willingness
to pay for the net marginal utility received by moving from unit k-th apartment to k   1
is smaller than it is in moving from k + 1 to k. By this reason, in comparison with lower
households, an upper household prefers to spend its income on things other than dwellings.
As a consequence, if the diminishing marginal rate is large to some extent, the price for a
higher category of housing hardly rises enough to supplement the rent decrements in lower
categories.
We also consider the following di¤erent diminishing rates of marginal utility for composite
goods.
(2) Diminishing rates of marginal utility for ca.
(i) a = 0:55;
(ii) a = 0:5;
(iii) a = 0:45:
A diminishing rate for hk is xed as hk 1 = hk. We assume the same changes for income
distribution as (1). The rent distributions with r40 = 50 are given in Fig. 4.3.
As seen from Fig. 4.3, an increase in the diminishing rate for composite good brings
an e¤ect opposite to (1) for higher categories. It is also found that the magnitude of rent
di¤erence becomes larger as the diminishing rate becomes smaller.
We can also explain the reason for such a tendency in a manner similar to (1). If the
diminishing rate for composite good becomes large, an upper household wants to spend its
income on dwellings rather than on composite good. As a consequence, if a diminishing rate
is large to some extent, the price for the higher category rises enough to supplement rent
decrements in lower categories.
4.4.2 Conrmation of Theorem 4.3.2. (2)
Suppose T = f = 6; w1 = w2 = 200, w3 = w4 = 300; w5 = w6 = 500 and m =
Pk
t=1wt
(then, G(k) =
Pk
t=1wt for k = 1; :::; 6). The utility function is given by u(e
k; c) = hk +
p
c
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Figure 4.3: Rent distributions when income distribution changes (2).
(k = 0; :::; 6); where h1 = 5:1; h2 = 4:4; h3 = 3:7; h4 = 3; h5 = 2; h6 = 1 and h0 = 0.
We assume that household income is lognormally distributed.12 We adopt the following
three lognormal distributions: the mean of lognormal distribution is xed as E = 330, and
variances are V1 = 1000, V2 = 20000 and V3 = 80000. Fig. 4.4 depicts the probability density
distributions for them.
In Fig. 4.4, the highest graph corresponds to (E; V1) (the initial distribution), the sec-
ond highest corresponds to (E; V2) (denoted hats), and the remaining is (E; V3) = 80000
(denoted it by double hats). We generate three sets of 2000 random numbers following each
distribution. Table 4.1 gives boundary incomes and Gini coe¢ cients for each income set.
Table 4.1 shows that income inequality increases as the variance increases, and the mag-
nitude of income di¤erence is monotone. The locations of household i in Condition InE are
G(3)  bi < G(4) and G(2)  bbi < G(3) (both hold for (2) of Theorem 4.3.2).
Let rf = r6 = 50. Calculated di¤erential rent vectors are (r1; :::; r6), (br1; :::; br5; r6),
(bbr1; :::;bbr5; r6) and are illustrated in Table 4.2 and Fig. 4.5.
12We say that a (positive) random variable X is lognormally distributed with parameters  and 2 i¤
Y = lnX is normally distributed with mean  and variance 2. The lognormal distribution is denoted by
(; 2). The probability density function of X  (; 2) is given by
f(x) =
1p
2x
exp

  (lnx  )
2
22

(x > 0):
The mean E, variance V , median M and mode D of (; 2) are given by E = exp( + 1
2
2); V =
exp(2 + 2)

exp(2)  1 ; M = exp() and D = exp(   2). By them, we have D < M < E, and thus,
(; 2) has a long-tail form. These dinitions and properties are due to Crow and Shimizu (1988). The
lognormal distribution is aften used as an approximation of an income distribution.
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Figure 4.4: Probability density distributions of lognormal distributions.
Boundary incomes Di¤erences in IG(k)
k G(k) IG(k) bIG(k) bbIG(k) bIG(k)   IG(k) bbIG(k)   bIG(k)
1 200 371:6 514:7 660:5 143:1 145:8
2 400 356:7 433:8 470:1 77:1 36:3
3 700 341:8 356:1 346:0 14:3  10:1
4 1000 329:3 305:2 264:3  24:1  40:9
5 1500 310:1 231:4 167:5  78:6  63:9
Gini 0:05 0:22 0:36
Table 4.1: Changes in boundary incomes
Changes in rk Di¤erences in rk
k rk brk bbrk brk   rk bbrk   brk
1 173:2 177:2 176:1 4:0  1:0
2 153:0 150:9 114:8  2:0  6:1
3 132:5 126:9 119:1  5:6  7:8
4 111:8 105:2 97:5  6:5  7:7
5 81:3 75:9 70:7  5:3  5:3
6 50 50 50 0 0
Table 4.2: Changes in di¤erential rent vectors
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Figure 4.5: Rent distributions when income distribution changes (3).
As seen from Table 4.2 and Fig. 4.5, the rst change (from fIigi2M to fbIigi2M ) causes
a rise only for the rst category [Theorem 4.3.1. (2) occurs]. On the other hand, the second
change causes a decline in rents for every category [Theorem 4.3.1. (3) occurs]. These results
are consistent with Theorem 4.3.2. Thus, both Theorem 4.3.1. (2) and (3) may occur when
income inequality increases but the other parameters do not change.
4.5 Conclusions
We have studied the comparative statics analysis based on the assignment market model. In
particular, we present how rising income inequality a¤ects a competitive rent distribution.
The key assumptions of the model are identical utility function and normality for housing
quality. A competitive rent vector can be then calculated by a system of equations.
Our main comparative statics result is Theorem 4.3.1, stating that an increase in income
inequality a¤ects three cases of the competitive rent vector: (1) rent rises for every category,
(2) a rent rises for upper categories and falls for lower categories or (3) rent falls for every
category. Further Theorem 4.3.2 implies that (1) is an extreme case, while either (2) or (3)
is possible when an inequality increases. We also show the relation between a diminishing
rate of marginal utility and a rent change when income inequality increases, using numerical
examples.
We conclude this chapter with two remarks about future subjects. In Section 4.4.1, we
showed by numerical examples that there is a relation between marginal rate of substitution
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and e¤ects of increased income inequality for equilibrium rents. One future subject is to
show this relation by a proposition. The other subject is about a relaxation of our market
model. In Section 4.3.1, we mentioned that since we assumed that the apartment stock is
xed (Assumption E), our study is a short-run equilibrium analysis. On the other hand,
a change in income structure is often considered a mid- or long-term structural change. A
subject is to relax the xed apartment stock assumption and compare our result with the
result under such a relaxed model.
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Appendix A
Additional Results for Chapter 2
A.1 Pareto e¢ ciency of competitive equilibria
In this appendix, we show the Pareto e¢ ciency of competitive equilibria in the GAM model.
To show this, we rst transform the sellers cost function into the utility function. Let
t = 1; :::; T and Nt be the set of all sellers providing indivisible goods t. For each j 2 Nt, Let
(wj ; Ij) 2 Z+R+ be the initial endowment of seller j (the value wj is seller js the maximum
possible supply of indivisible goods t). We transform cj : Z+ ! R into uj : Z+ R+ ! R as
uj(k; d) =
8><>: d  cj(wj   k) if k < wj ;d  cj(0) if k  wj :
The prot maximization condition for seller (Denition 2.2.1.(2)) is transformed by the
(equivalent) utility maximization condition: for each t = 1; :::; T and j 2 Nt, uj(wj   yj ; Ij +
ptyj)  uj(wj   k; Ij + ptk) for every k  wj :
Now, let
M = f(10 ; :::; m0 ; 1; :::; n) 2 Rm0+n :
P
i2M[N i =
P
i2M[N Iig;
I = f(x10 ; :::; xm0 ; k1; :::; kn) 2 fe0; :::; eT gm0 
Q
j2Nf0; :::; wjg :P
i2M xi +
PT
t=1
P
j2Nt kje
t =
PT
t=1
P
j2Nt wje
tg:
This M is the set of all money allocations and I is the set of all indivisibles allocations in the
market.
We then obtain the following assertion.
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Theorem A. For any competitive equilibrium (p; x; y) 2 C, its allocation (xi; wj   yj ; Ii  
pxi; Ij +ptyj)i2M;j2N 2 IM is Pareto e¢ cient.1
Proof. Let (x0i; k
0
j ; i; j)i2M;j2N 2 IM be an allocation satisfying
ui(x
0
i; i)  ui(xi; Ii   pxi) for every i 2M , (A.1)
uj(k
0
j ; j)  uj(wj   yj ; Ij + ptyj) for every j 2 Nt and t = 1; :::; T: (A.2)
We show these inequalities hold with equalities.
Let M1 = fi 2 M : Ii  px0ig and M2 = fi 2 M : Ii < px0ig. For buyer i 2 M1, the
relation
ui(x
0
i; i)  ui(xi; Ii   pxi)  ui(x0i; Ii   px0i)
holds by Eq. (A.1) and utility maximization condition. This and Assumption A1 imply
i  Ii   px0i for every i 2M1; (A.3)
hence, P
i2M1 i 
P
i2M1 [Ii   px0i]: (A.4)
For buyer i 2M2, the relation i  0 > Ii   px0i holds by Eq. (A.1) and Assumption A2.
Hence, P
i2M1 i >
P
i2M1 [Ii   px0i]: (A.5)
For t = 1; :::; T and seller j 2 Nt, the relation
uj(k
0
j ; j)  uj(wj   yj ; Ij + ptyj)  uj(k0j ; Ij + pt(wj   k0j))
holds by Eq. (A.2) and utility maximization condition. This implies
j   cj(wj   k0j)  Ij + pt(wj   k0j)  cj(wj   k0j) for every j 2 Nt (t = 1; :::; T );
that is,
j  Ij + pt(wj   k0j) for every j 2 Nt (t = 1; :::; T ); (A.6)
1 In the allocation, t satises j 2 Nt.
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hence, P
j2N j 
P
j2N [Ij + pt(wj   k0j)]: (A.7)
On the other hand, by money balance condition (the denition of M), it holds that
P
i2M[N i =
P
i2M[N Ii. (A.8)
Furthermore, since
P
i2M px
0
i =
PT
t=1
P
j2Nt pt(wj   k0j), we have
P
i2M[N Ii =
P
i2M1(Ii   px0i) +
P
i2M2(Ii   px0i) +
PT
t=1
P
j2Nt [Ij + pt(wj   k0j)]. (A.9)
Eqs. A.4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 imply M2 = ;. Hence, Eq. A.9 can be rewritten by
P
i2M[N i =
P
i2M (Ii   px0i) +
PT
t=1
P
j2Nt [Ij + pt(wj   k0j)].
This and Eqs. A3, 6 imply
i = Ii   px0i for every i 2M; (A.10)
j = Ij + pt(wj   k0j) for every j 2 Nt (t = 1; :::; T ): (A.11)
Eqs. A.10 and 11 together with utility maximization condition imply that Eqs. A.1 and 2
hold with equalities.
We can easily show that a maximum (minimum) competitive allocation is seller-optimal
(buyer-optimal) Pareto e¢ cient.
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Appendix B
Proofs for Chapter 3
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3.2.3
To prove Theorem 3.2.3, we need the following lemma.
Lemma B.1.1. Let (p; x; y) and (p0; x0; y0) be any competitive equilibria and suppose that
there is i 2M such that xi = ek and x0i = el, k 6= l. Then, pk Q p0k if and only if pl Q p0l.
The proof of Lemma B.1.1 needs the following lemma by Sai (2014), p. 45.
Lemma B.1.2 (Sai (2014)). Let (p; x; y) and (p0; x0; y0) be any competitive equilibria and
let k be an integer with 1  k  T . Then, pk < p0k implies yk = y0k:
Proof of Lemma B.1.1. (If part of <) Suppose pl < p0l. It follows from the supposition
and UM of Denition 3.2.1.(1), ui(ek; Ii pk)  ui(el; Ii pl) > ui(el; Ii p0l)  ui(ek; Ii p0k).
Thus we have ui(ek; Ii   pk) > ui(ek; Ii   p0k), which implies pk < p0k.
(Only if of <) Suppose pk < p0k. Suppose, on the contrary, pl  p0l. By lemma B.1.2, it
holds that yk = y0k. On the other hand, in equilibrium (p
0; x0; y0), one household i switches
his housing choice from k to l. This implies that at least one household j(6= i) switches his
housing choice fromm(6= k) to k. By the supposition and UM, uj(em; Ij pm) uj(ek; Ij pk)
> uj(e
k; Ij   p0k)  uj(em; Ij   p0m). This inequality derives pm < p0m, which implies m 6= l.
In the same manner with the above discussion, pm < p0m implies ym = y0m, and in equilibrium
(p0; x0; y0), at least one household switches his choice from n(6= m) to m. This also derives
pn < p
0
n, n 6= l and yn = y0n, so this process continues. Since M is nite, this process does
not nish even with all the possible household switched. This implies the hypothesis pl  p0l
is false. Thus, we obtain pl < p0l.
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(If of =) Suppose pl = p0l. By only if part of <, it is enough to show that pk  p0k. It follows
from the supposition and UM, ui(ek; Ii pk)  ui(el; Ii pl) = ui(el; Ii p0l)  ui(ek; Ii p0k).
Thus we have ui(ek; Ii   pk)  ui(ek; Ii   p0k), which implies pk  p0k.
(Only if of =): Suppose pk = p0k. By if part of <, it is enough to show that pl  p0l.
Suppose, on the contrary, pl > p0l. By lemma B.1.2, it holds that yl = y
0
l. On the other
hand, in equilibrium (p0; x0; y0), one household i switches his housing choice from k to l. This
implies that at least one household j(6= i) switches his housing choice from l to m(6= l). By
the supposition and UM,uj(em; Ij   p0m)  uj(el; Ij   p0l) > uj(el; Ij   pl)  uj(em; Ij   pm).
This inequality derives pm > p0m, which implies m 6= k. In the same manner with the above
discussion, pm > p0m implies ym = y0m, and in equilibrium (p0; x0; y0), at least one household
switches his choice from m to n(6= m). This also derives pn > p0n, n 6= k and yn = y0n, so this
process continues. Since M is nite, the process does not nish even with all the possible
household switched. This implies the hypothesis pl > p0l is false Thus, we obtain pl  p0l.
(If and only if of >): It is immediately derived from pk  p0k if and only if pl  p0l.
Proof of Theorem 3.2.3. Let (p; x; y) and (p0; x0; y0) be any competitive equilibria and
suppose that p0k < pk and p
0
l > pl for some k; l. Then we construct a tuple (p; x; y) such that
(m-1): p
k
= minfpk; p0kg for k with 1  k  T ;
(m-2): for each i 2M; xi =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
xi if xi = ek and pk  p0k for some k with 1  k  T;
x0i if x
0
i = e
k and pk > p0k for some k with 1  k  T;
0 otherwise;
(m-3): for k = 1;    ; T; y
k
= yk:
Note that the above x is well dened: indeed, by Lemma B.1.1, each i 2M chooses at most
one category k in x. In the following, we show that a tuple (p; x; y) satises competitive
equilibrium conditions (UM, PM and BDS).
UM: Let i 2M . There are the following three cases.
(Case 1): xi = xi = e
k: By (m-1), we have the equality p
k
= pk. It is straightforward
that ui(ek; Ii   pk)  ui(em; Ii   pm) for all m with pm = pm. Let l be the category which
household i chooses in (p0; x0; y0). By Lemma B.1.1, we have pl  p0l: This inequality together
with UM imply ui(ek; Ii   pk)  ui(el; Ii   pl)  ui(el; Ii   p0l)  ui(em; Ii   pm) for all m
with p
m
= p0m. Thus (p; x) satises UM.
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(Case 2): xi = x
0
i = e
k: By (m-1), we have the equality pk = p0k: It is straightforward that
ui(e
k; Ii   pk)  ui(em; Ii   pm) for all m with pm = p0m. Let l be the category which
household i chooses in (p; x; y). By Lemma B.1.1, we have pl > p0l: This inequality together
with UM imply ui(ek; Ii   p0k)  ui(el; Ii   p0l) > ui(el; Ii   pl)  ui(em; Ii   pm) for all m
with p
m
= pm. Thus (p; x) satises UM.
(Case 3): xi = 0: by (m-2), we have xi = x
0
i = 0: Thus (p; x) satises UM.
PM and BDS: Let k 2 Z+ with 1  k  T: If pk = pk, landlord k maximizes his prot
with production y
k
= yk. By (m-2), xi = xi = e
k for all i 2 Mk. This implies
P
i2Mk xi =P
i2Mk xi = yke
k = y
k
ek, that is, BDS holds for category k. Otherwise (p
k
= p0k), the
landlord k maximizes his prot with production y
k
= yk = y
0
k (by Lemma B.1.2). The
balance of total demand and supply is inherited from the equilibrium (p0; x0; y0):
The vector p satises p  p and p  p0: Since the set of competitive rent vectors is a
compact set, there is the minimum competitive rent vector in the market (M;N). In the
dual manner, we can also prove the existence of the maximum competitive rent vector.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 3.3.3
Proof of (1). We proof this by mathematical induction over k = f   1; f   2 ; :::; 1.
Let k = f   1: By utility maximization condition and the upper rent equation (2.1), we have
u(ef 1; IG(f 1) pf 1)  u(ef ; IG(f 1) pf ) and u(ef 1; IG(f 1) rf 1) = u(ef ; IG(f 1) rf ):
Thus, by the condition rf = pf , we have u(ef 1; IG(f 1)   pf 1)  u(ef 1; IG(f 1)   rf 1):
This imply IG(f 1)   pf 1  IG(f 1)   rf 1, that is, rf 1  pf 1: Suppose that for k = l
with 1 < l  f   1; the inequality rl  pl holds. Let k = l   1. By utility maximiza-
tion condition and Eq. (2.1), we have u(el 1; IG(l 1)   pl 1)  u(el; IG(l 1)   pl) and
u(el 1; IG(l 1)   rl 1) = u(el; IG(l 1)   rl): On the other hand, rl  pl and Assumption
A imply u(el; IG(l 1)   pl)  u(el; IG(l 1)   rl): This inequality together with previous in-
equalities imply u(el 1; IG(l 1) pl 1)  u(el 1; IG(l 1) rl 1): This and Assumption A imply
IG(l 1)   pl 1  IG(l 1)   rl 1, that is, rl 1  pl 1: Therefore we have rk  pk for all k with
1  k  f   1:
Proof of (2). It is proved by the dual manner with (1). Let k = f   1: By utility maxi-
mization condition and the lower rent equation (2.2), we have u(ef 1; IG(f 1)+1   pf 1) 
u(ef ; IG(f 1)+1   pf ) and u(ef 1; IG(f 1)+1   rf 1) = u(ef ; IG(f 1)+1   rf ): These together
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with rf = pf imply u(e
f 1; IG(f 1)+1   pf 1)  u(ef 1; IG(f 1)+1   rf 1): Thus, we have
rf 1  pf 1: Suppose that for k = l; 1 < l  f   1; rl  pl and let k = l   1. By utility
maximization condition and (2.2), we have u(el 1; IG(l 1)+1   pl 1)  u(el; IG(l 1)+1   pl)
and u(el 1; IG(l 1)+1   rl 1) = u(el; IG(l 1)+1   rl): On the other hand, rl  pl and As-
sumption A imply u(el; IG(l 1)+1   pl)  u(el; IG(l 1)+1   rl): This inequality together with
previous inequalities imply u(el 1; IG(l 1)+1 pl 1)  u(el 1; IG(l 1)+1 rl 1): Thus, we have
rl 1  pl 1: Therefore we have rk  pk for all k with 1  k  f   1:
B.3 Proof of Theorem 3.3.4.(2)
We rst show the following lemma.
Lemma B.3.1 Let (p; x; y) be a maximal competitive equilibrium. For each category k =
1; :::; f   1, there exist households i; j 2 M such that xi = ek, Ii = IG(k) and xj = ek+1,
Ij = IG(k+1).
Proof. This is immediately proved from Lemma 3.3.1.(2).
Proof of Theorem 3.3.4.(2). By Lemma B.3.1, there exist households i; j such that
xi = e
k, Ii = IG(k) and xj = ek+1, Ij = IG(k+1). utility maximization condition for households
i = G(k) and j = G(k + 1), it holds that
u(ek; IG(k)   pk)  u(ek+1; IG(k)   pk+1) and
u(ek+1; IG(k)+1   pk+1)  u(ek; IG(k)+1   pk):
Suppose that condition (i) of Theorem 3.3.4.(2) holds. Then, by the above inequalities, we
have
u(ek; IG(k)+1   pk) = u(ek+1; IG(k)+1   pk+1),
that is, the lower rent equation holds.
Suppose that condition (ii) of Theorem 3.3.4.(2) holds. We prove by contradiction. Suppose
that there is a category t with 1  t  f   1 such that
u(ek; IG(k)+1   pk) = u(ek+1; IG(k)+1   pk+1) for k = 1; :::; t  1;
u(et; IG(t)+1   pt) < u(et+1; IG(t)+1   pt+1).
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Then, we can decrease pt and pt 1, ..., p1 slightly into p0t and p0t 1, ..., p01 such that
u(et; IG(t)+1   p0t) < u(et+1; IG(t)+1   pt+1);
p0t > Ct(yt)  Ct(yt   1):
(B.1)
u(ek; IG(k)+1   p0k) = u(ek+1; IG(k)+1   p0k+1) and
p0k > Ck(yk)  Ck(yk   1) for k =; 1; :::; t  1.
(B.2)
We now let the new rent vector p as
pk =
8><>: pk for k  t+ 1;p0k for k  t:
In the following, we show a tuple (p; x; y) is also a competitive rent vector: this is a contra-
dictory claim since p is the minimum competitive rent vector. Since (x; y) is a competitive
allocation, the balance of total supply and demand condition is satised. Furthermore, by the
bottoms of Eqs. (B.1) and (B.2), each landlords prot maximization condition holds with
(p; y). Utility maximization condition of households is checked by as follows. Let i 2 M
with xi = ek. We easily nd u(ek; Ii   pk)  u(ek
0
; Ii   pk0) for price unchanged categories
k0 = t+ 1; :::; T . The remaining part is shown by the following case analysis:
(i) The case of k  t + 1: By the denition of G(k), we have Ii  IG(t)+1. This together
with the top of Eq. (B.1) and Assumption D imply u(ek; Ii   pk) > u(et; Ii   pt ). Fur-
thermore, this inequality together with the top of Eq. (B.2) and Assumption D imply
u(ek; Ii   pk) > u(et; Ii   pt )  u(et 1; Ii   pt 1)      u(e1; Ii   p1).
(ii) The case of k < t + 1: Let k0 with k < k0 < t + 1. By the denition of G(k),
we have Ii  IG(k)  IG(k)+1. This together with Eq. (B.2) and Assumption D imply
u(ek; Ii   pk)  u(ek
0
; Ii   pk0). Furthermore let k00 with 1 < k00 < k. By the denition
of G(k), we have Ii  IG(k 1)+1. This together with Eq. (B.2) and Assumption D imply
u(ek; Ii   pk)  u(ek
00
; Ii   pk00). Combining them, we have u(ek; Ii   pk)  u(el; Ii   pl ) for
all l = 1; :::; t.
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Appendix C
Additional Results for Chapter 4
C.1 Income inequality and equitability of competitive alloca-
tions for households
In this appendix, we briey mention equitability of competitive allocations in our rental
housing market model. As stated in Chapter 1, Svensson (1983), Alkan, Demange and Gale
(1991) and Sakai (2007) studied equitability properties in the market with indivisibilities.
Their model is di¤erent to ours in that they assumed only buyers, the same number of buyers
and indivisible units, no initial endowments, and without homogeneous utility function.
We give some notations (denitions are due to Foley, 1967; Varian, 1974). Recall that
the consumption set of households are given by X = fe0; e1; : : : ; eT g  R+. Let an m-tuple
a = (a1; :::; am) 2 Xm be a consumption allocation. We say that i envies j at a 2 Xm i¤
u(aj) > u(ai). We say that a 2 Xm is the equitable (envy-free) allocation i¤ u(ai)  u(aj) for
every i; j 2M . Note that in our framework, this condition can be translated by u(ai) = u(aj)
for every i; j 2M .
The following proposition holds in our model.
Proposition C.1. Let (p; x; y) be a competitive equilibrium and let i; j 2 M: Then, Ii  Ij
if and only if u(xi; Ii   pxi)  u(xj ; Ij   pxj) (note that  is replaced by ; >;<; or =).
Proof. (Only If ) By the antecedent Ii > Ij and utility maximization condition, we have
u(xi; Ii pxi)  u(xj ; Ii pxj) > u(xj ; Ij pxj). (If ) Suppose, on the contrary, Ii  Ij . Then,
we obtain the contradictory inequality by utility maximization condition: u(xj ; Ij   pxj) 
u(xi; Ij   pxi)  u(xi; Ii   pxi).
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This proposition means that if there exist two households having di¤erent incomes, then
the lower-income household envies the higher-income household in any competitive alloca-
tions; conversely, if some household envies the other in a competitive allocation, then the
income of the envied household is higher. Furthermore, if incomes of some two households
are the same, then their utility levels also the same in any competitive allocations; conversely,
if utility levels of some two households are the same in a competitive allocation, then their
incomes also the same.
The following corollary follows from the proposition.
Corollary C.2. Let (p; x; y) be a competitive equilibrium. Then every household has the
same income if and only if an m-tuple ((x1; I1   px1); :::; (xm; Im   pxm)) is an equitable
allocation.
Thus, when the household income distribution has even a little inequality, any compet-
itive allocation does not satises equitability (conversely, if a competitive allocation does
not satises equitability, then the income distribution has an inequality). Theorems 4.3.1,2
and Corollary C.2 imply that rising income inequality tends to cause both dampening the
equitability on household allocations and a decline in landlord revenues. Note that since any
competitive equilibrium is Pareto e¢ cient, an equitable competitive allocation is a fair alloca-
tion.1 Note also that the only-if part of the corollary holds without identical utility function
assumption, whereas the if part does not holds without this assumption. The next example
shows a case that income inequality exists but a competitive allocation satises equitability.
Example C.3 (Equitable competitive equilibrium with income inequality exists). Suppose
that there are two households 1 and 2 with incomes I1 = 150 and I2 = 100, two di¤erent
apartments 1 and 2 (with reservation prices 50 and 36). Suppose that their utility functions
are given as
u1(e
k; c) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 +
p
c for k = 0;
4 +
p
c for k = 1;
1 +
p
c for k = 2;
u2(e
k; c) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 +
p
c for k = 0;
1 +
p
c for k = 1;
4 +
p
c for k = 2:
1Svensson (1983) and Sakai (2007) gave a result related to Corollary ??.2. According to them, a con-
sumption allocation ((x1; c1); :::; (xm; cm)) 2 Xm is a Walrasian allocation from equal income i¤ there exist
p 2 RT+ and I 2 R+ such that ci = I   pxi for all i 2 M and every household maximizes his utility, where I
is the implicit imcome. They showed that the set of equitable allocations coincides with the set of Walrasian
allocations from equal income.
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This setting explains, for example, the following situation: the apartment 1 is a relatively
large one located in a suburban area and the apartment 2 is a small one located in a central
city. Household 1 with higher income prefers the apartment 1 to 2, while the household 2
prefers the apartment 2 to 1.
Let p = (p1; p2) = (50; 36). Then, u1(e1; I1   p1) = 14 > u1(e0; I1) > u1(e2; I1   p2) and
u2(e
2; I2   p2) = 12 > u2(e0; I1) > u2(e1; I1   p1). Hence, a triple (p; (e1; e2); (1; 1)) is a
competitive equilibrium. On the other hand, u1(e1; I1   p1) = 14 > u1(e2; I2   p2) = 9 and
u2(e
2; I2   p2) = 12 > u2(e1; I1   p1) = 11. Hence, this equilibrium satises equitability but
income inequality exists.
82
Bibliography
[1] Alkan, A., Demange, G., Gale, D. (1991), Fair allocation of indivisible goods and criteria
of justice, Econometrica 59, 1023-1039.
[2] Alonso, W. (1964), Location and Land Use, Harvard University Press.
[3] Braid, R. M. (1981), The short-run comparative statics of a rental housing market,
Journal of Urban Economics, 10(3), 286-310.
[4] Debreu, G., Scarf, H. (1963), A limit theorem on the core of an economy, International
Economic Review, 4(3), 235-246.
[5] Demange, G., Gale, D. (1985), The strategy structure of two-sided matching markets,
Econometrica, 53(4), 873-888.
[6] Crow, E. L., Shimizu, K. (Eds.), (1988), Lognormal distributions: Theory and applica-
tions (Vol. 88). New York: Dekker.
[7] Foley, D. (1967), Resource allocation and the public sector, Yale Economic Esseys 7,
45-98.
[8] Fujita, M. (1989), Urban Economic Theory: Land Use and City Size, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
[9] Gretsky, N., Ostroy, J.M., Zame, W.R. (1999), Perfect competition in the continuous
assignment model, Journal of Economic Theory 88, 60118.
[10] Gul, F., Stacchetti, E. (1999), Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes, Journal of
Economic Theory 87, 95124.
[11] Ito, T. (2007), E¤ects of quality changes in rental housing markets with indivisibilities,
Regional Science and Urban Economics 37, 602-617.
83
[12] Kamecke, U. (1992), On the uniqueness of the solution to a large linear assignment
problem, Journal of Mathematical Economics 21, 509-521.
[13] Kaneko, M. (1982), The central assignment game and the assignment markets, Journal
of Mathematical Economics 10, 205232.
[14] Kaneko, M. (1983), Housing market with indivisibilities, Journal of Urban Economics
13, 2250.
[15] Kaneko, M., Wooders, M.H. (1996), The nonemptiness of the f-core of a game without
side payments, International Journal of Game Theory 25, 245-258.
[16] Kaneko, M., Wooders, M.H. (2004), Utility theories in cooperative games. In Handbook
of Utility Theory (pp. 1065-1098). Springer US.
[17] Kaneko, M., Ito, T., Osawa, Y. (2006), Duality in comparative statics in rental housing
markets with indivisibilities, Journal of Urban Economics 59, 142170.
[18] Kaneko, M., Yamamoto, Y. (1986), The existence and computation of competitive equi-
libria in markets with an indivisible commodity, Journal of Economic Theory 38, 118
136.
[19] Kelso, A.S., Crawford, V.P. (1982), Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substi-
tutes, Econometrica 50, 14831504.
[20] Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M., Green, J. (1995), Microeconomic theory (Vol. 1), New
York: Oxford University Press.
[21] Määttänen, N., Terviö, M. (2014), Income distribution and housing prices: an assignment
model approach, Journal of Economic Theory 151, 381-410.
[22] Mishra, D., Talman, D. (2010), Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the as-
signment model, Journal of Mathematical Economics 46, 620.
[23] Miyake, M. (1994), Comparative statics of assignment markets with general utilities,
Journal of Mathematical Economics 23, 519531.
[24] Murota, K. (2003), Discrete convex analysis, SIAM.
84
[25] Quinzii, M. (1984), Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities, International
Journal of Game Theory, 13(1), 41-60.
[26] Sai, S. (2014), The structure of competitive equilibria in an assignment market, Journal
of Mathematical Economics 51, 42-49.
[27] Sai, S. (2015), Evaluations of competitive rent vectors in housing markets with indivisi-
bilities, mimeo.
[28] Sakai, T. (2007), Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with
monetary compensations, Journal of Mathematical Economics 43, 549-563.
[29] Scarf, H.E. (1967), The core of an n-person game, Econometrica 35, 50-69.
[30] Serizawa, S., Morimoto, S. (2015), Strategy-proofness and e¢ ciency with non-quasi-
linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule, Theoretical Eco-
nomics 10, 445-487.
[31] Shapley, L.S., Scarf, H.E. (1974), On cores and indivisibility, Journal of Mathematical
Economics 1, 23-37.
[32] Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M. (1972), Assignment game I: The core, International Journal
of Game Theory 1, 111130.
[33] Svensson, L.-G. (1983), Large indivisibilities: an analysis with respect to price equilib-
rium and fairness, Econometrica 51, 939954.
[34] Varian, H. (1974), Equity, envy, and e¢ ciency, Journal of Economic Theory 9, 6391.
[35] von Böhm-Bawerk, E. (1891), The positive theory of capital, GE Stechert.
85
